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THE RISE AND FALL OF FAIR USE:
THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY MATERIALS
AGAINST COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
BY
NEW AND DEVELOPING MEDIA
HuGH J. CROSSLAND*
St. Coumba, sitting up all night to do it, furtively made a
copy of abbot Fennian's Psalter, and how the abbot protested
as loudly as if he had been a member of the Stationers Company,
and brought an action in detinue, or its Irsh equivalent, for
Columba's copy, and how King Diarmid sitting in Tara's halls,
not then deserted, gave judgment for the abbot ....
I. INTRODUCTION
Many copies of literary material-books and periodicals-
have been made in violation of the law. The growing use' of
copying machines is causing a decline in the market for litera-
ture, is unfair competition2 to the publisher and copyright
owner, and has possible constitutional significance.3 Although
the copyright statute4 grants absolute rights5 protecting writ-
ings that are published in accordance with its provisions, the
courts have put a gloss on the statute by allowing non-infringing
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; B.B.A.,
M.B.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Wayne State University; LL.M., Yale
University; Member of the Michigan Bar.
t BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURERS ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN
Booxs 42 (1899).
1. The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1963, at 24, col. 2 carried this news
and a gloomy forecast for the future that is now upon us:
Well over 300 million high speed copies of various published material are
made each month in the U.S., one maker of such machines estimates.
That's some 50% more than were produced monthly as recently as 1961,
he figures. By 1965, the monthly rate will top 600 million, the official
predicts.
2. Unfair competition is the "practice of endeavoring to substitute one's own
goods or products in the markets for those of another ... by means of imitat-
ing .... , the imitation being carried far enough to mislead the general
public .... " BLAci's LAW DIcrIONARY 1699 (4th ed. 1951).
3. U. S. CONST. art, I, § 8 gives Congress the power "[to promote the
progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries ....
4. Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964).
5. Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
6. The pertinent provisions dealing with the securing of copyright include
17 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 16, 19 & 20 (1964).
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copying in some cases under the doctrine of fair use;7 thus,
the measure of protection has been diluted.
The time was when a reader made a pen or pencil copy of
but a few passages of copyrighted material for his own pur-
poses. Such private copying was customary and beyond the pale
of copyright challenge.8 Hand copying was automatically self-
policing: the nature of hand copying rendered its own quanti-
tative limit on the number of copies which could be made. The
copyright owner could not feasibly control private copying 9
and use, but more importantly, his livelihood was not in jeop-
ardy.10 Reproduction for private use, however, takes on different
dimensions when made by modern copying devices" capable
of reproducing quickly any volume of material in any number
of copies. This is especially true when the copies are made
to be given to other persons, say students.12 Here, there is
direct competition with the sale of the work, the copy being a
substitute for the original and leading to a diminished market
for the publisher. In this case a private use is changed to a
public use.'8
7. Although the Code speaks of the "exclusive rights" of the copyright
holder, as a matter of general experience it is known that some copying of
copyrighted works is permitted. Book reviewers quote from copyrighted
works in their criticism; authors create burlesques or parodies of copyrighted
material; and newspapers frequently contain synopses of copyrighted matter.
These three uses seem to be infringements of the "exclusive" rights granted to
the copyright owner under section 1 of the Copyright Act; yet the courts have
found no infringement here. Courts have said that such uses were fair uses and
not infringing uses. AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRAcTicE 757-66 (1936).
8. KAPLAN & BROWN, COPYRIGHT 314 (1960). See also Cohen, Fair Use
in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYmposium 43, 58 (1955).
9. U. S. HousE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87th CoNG., 1st SEss., REPORT
OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, GENERAL REvISION OF THE U. S. COPYRIGHT
LAw 25 (Comm. Print 1961).
10. Since actual damages or profits would be almost incapable of proof,
a court would be compelled to assess the minimum of $250 if it found a tech-
nical infringement. "There's been a tendency, in some cases for the courts
to find no infringement in order to avoid the minimum of $250." Id. at 178,
See Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282
(8th Cir. 1939); cf. Gross v. Van Dyk Grovure Co., 230 F. 412, 413 (2d
Cir. 1916).
11. Needham states that "'do it yourself' home copyright infringement kits
are available to everyone." Needham, Tape Recording, Photocopying, and
Fair Use, 10 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPoSIUM 75 (1959). A form of copying more
subtle, more sophisticated than present direct reprography techniques is that
done to form the massive information systems of computers. See Newsweek,
Oct. 21, 1963, at 92; Freed, Prepare Now for Machine-Assisted Legal Re-
search, 47 A.B.A.J. 764 (1961); N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1962, at 17, col. 6.
12. MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862, 863 (D. Mass. 1914).
13. Hand copying for private use, although a violation of the literal transla-
tion of the statute, is allowable as a fair use. But the rationale breaks down
even when the reproduction is for very limited distribution for teaching pur-
poses. Id. at 866-67.
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The making of a single copy for a public or commercial
purpose such as resale might well be an infringement,14 unless
the copy is of de minimus proportions.15 Multiple copy pi-
rating for public use, whether commercial or not, is more clearly
an infringement because of the competition-substitution aspect
of such copying and the notion that any public proliferation
or publication infringes the exclusive right of the copyright
owner10 The user takes a free ride instead of paying his own
way as he should.
The distinction, I would suggest, is simply private use vis-a-vis
public use. This is not a sticky or vague concept like reason-
able or commercial use.' 7 Should the public appropriation ac-
cord with the traditional notions of fair use, the use, though
copyright infringement, is privileged and justified. But we
are still faced with a dilemma: How can copyright holders
stop substantially all the infringing unfair reproduction now
spreading apace because of the new technology? How can
14. "Mere printing or copying ... without proof of sales thereof, will con-
stitute an infringement." Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 63 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
15. Publishers, rather than spending money on law suits, have attempted to
solve the problem through private agreements. See Smith, The Copying of
Literary Property in Library Collections, 46 LAw LiBRARY J. 197, 202-04
(1953). In the case of MacMillan Co. v. King, 223 F. 862 (D. Mass. 1914),
the court enjoined the defendant from the further use of plaintiff's book,
stating that "proof of actual damage is not necessary for the issuance of an
injunction, if infringement appears and damage may probably follow from its
continuance." Id. at 868. Publishers could take a cue from this case, when
bringing suit in a penumbral case, to sue for injunction alone under 17 U.S.C.
§ 112 (1964) and not force the court to choose between minimum dam-
ages of $250 under section 101(b) and no infringement at all. Lest one begin
to think that old rulings like Novello v. Sudlow, 138 Eng. Rep. 869 (1852)
would be overturned today in view of such public policy reasons as promoting
the velocity of ideas, the case of Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir.
1962) should be examined.
16. Assuming some copying of a copyrighted work, the crucial question is
whether or not defendant's work is or may be used as a substitute for plain-
tiff's work. In case after case the court has sought to find if there has been
this unfair competition by the user, called wrongful appropriation. See
National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294 (7th Cir.
1902) ; Produce Reporter Co. v. Fruit Produce Rating Agency, 1 F.2d 58 (E.D.
Ill. 1924); Ginn & Co., v. Apollo Pub. Co., 215 F. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1914);
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Since
the broad rationale of INS v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) appears in copyright
cases whenever the issue of substitution or commercialism exists, it is reason-
able to say that the concept of fair use is the same in copyright law and un-
fair competition. See generally Leach & Feldman, The Relationship Between
Copyright & Unfair Competition Principles, 10 CoPYRIGHT L. SYmposIum
266 (1959).
17. See Petre, Statutory Copyright Protection for Books and Magazines
Against Copying Machines, 39 NoTRE DA=sn L. REv. 161 (1964).
1968]
3
Crossland: The Rise and Fall of Fair Use: The Protection of Literary Materia
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SouT CARoLTNA LAw REwV
users be supplied with the copies they need to promote progress
without undercutting the publishers' market?
Since to relieve the symptoms is not to cure the disease, I
would propose a broad battery of measures to attack the copy-
ing cancer. My underlying theory is to leave the doctrine of
fair use in pristine form and to provide a statutory licensing
framework with the maximum of private ordering under a clear-
ing house arrangement.
II. LnirrAioN or 'm RIGHT TO Excijsrvrry:
TH DoorNE or FAm UsE
Essentially, a copyright,18 when secured by compliance with
the copyright act,19 gives to the proprietor the right to print
or otherwise reproduce, publish, distribute, sell or transfer
18. Here we come to the crux of the technological revolution in copying.
It is now possible-in fact, it is widespread practice-to use a copyright
holder's work without his being able to claim a sale of it.
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964).
A dual system of copyright protection exists in the United States; common
law protection and federal statutory protection. This paper will deal exclusive-
ly with the statutory copyright except for the brief discussion of the common
law in this note.
The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) preserves and leaves undisturbed
the common law rights of an author or proprietor in his unpublished work.
The common law rights of an author exist in his unpublished manuscript.
These rights include ownership of the physical manuscript, the right to its
first publication, the right to prevent the unauthorized publication of the
manuscript, and the right to secure a statutory copyright. See AMDUR, CoP'-
IUGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (1936). Once an idea is in manuscript form, it
is automatically protected by common law. See id. The author may submit
it to a publisher, read it to a friend, or do anything short of general publica-
tion, Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus 147 F. 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1906), alfd, 210
U.S. 339 (1907), and the manuscript remains the exclusive property of the
author. A general publication or dissemination to the public, "as implies an
abandonment of the right of copyright or its dedication to the public,"
Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 326 (2d Cir. 1904),
terminates the common law copyright. The work then has fallen into the
public domain and becomes public property if the author allows this general
publication-say offering copies for sale or distributing them to the public-
without complying with the copyright act.
Compliance with the act will insure continuous copyright protection since this
statutory coverage begins where common law copyright protection ends. The
common law right is a prepublication right. Upon general publication, either
the work is protected by statute, if the requirements of the statute are met, or
the work passes to the public where it can never be retrieved. American Code
Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829 (2d Cir. 1922). Statutory copyright, therefore, is
a copyright after general publication.
The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1964) accords statutory protection to
certain enumerated unpublished works; with this exception, the statute does
not reach unpublished works. It follows that the doctrine of fair use is lim-
ited to copyrighted works, and is inapplicable in an action to enjoin an unauthor-
ized use. Golding v. RKO Pictures, Inc., 35 Cal. 2d 690, 221 P.2d 95 (1950).
[Vol. 20
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ownership in an original work of literature to the exclusion
of others.20 It is a monopoly, as Judge Learned Hand opined,
"to prevent others from reproducing the copyrighted work."
21
However, unlike a patent monopoly which grants to the patentee
the right to the absolute use of the patented article 22 the
copyright "monopoly" is subject to any "fair use" the public
may make of the copyrighted work.23 While ownership rights
are to be protected, "the primary object in conferring the
monopoly lies in the general benefits derived by the public from
the labors of authors." 24 This has been the policy followed by
Congress2 5 and the courts both in patent
2 6 and copyright2 7
litigation.
All actions for copyright infringement are based on section
1 of the act.28 But since infringement is not defined in the
statute, a judicial wrestling match2 9 must decide the degree of
exclusivity of the copyright holder's "exclusive rights."80 The
20. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932); American
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907); Carter v. Bailey, 64
Me. 458 (1874). Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) gives the proprietor
"the exclusive right (a) to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copy-
righted work." Many other rights are implicitly recognized in sections 1(b)
through (3). The most recent copyright law revision bill, H. R. 2512, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), while recognizing this general feature of copyright
has spelled out other rights, including the following: preparation of deriva-
tives, § 106(2); performance in public, § 106(4); and display in public,
§ 106(5).
21. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
22. See, e.g., Avery v. Wilson, 20 F. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1884); Crown Cork
& Seal Co. v. State, 87 Md. 687, 40 A. 1074 (1898) ; Commonwealth v. Central
Dist. & Printing Tel. Co., 145 Pa. 121, 22 A. 841 (1891). See also 35 U.S.C.
§ 154, which grants to patent owners "the right to exclude others from using
... the invention."
23. See, e.g., Loew's, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 174 (S.D. Cal.
1955), affd sub. nom., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'd memo. by an equally divided Court sub nor. CBS v. Loew's, Inc. 356
U.S. 43 (1958) ; Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
24. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes).
25. See H. R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 2924, 3701-05, 3761,
3765-68 (1909).
26. See, e.g., Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50 (1923); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Torok
v. Watson, 122 F. Supp. 788 (D.D.C. 1954).
27. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) ; Becker v. Loew's, Inc.
133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1944) ; Martinetti v.
Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (No. 9,173) (C.C. Cal. 1867).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
29. A classic unsporting event is Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
30. Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
1968]
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protection afforded by a copyright contemplates and permits fair
use of the copyrighted property.31 Courts have typically re-
solved this problem by requiring substantial copying of the
physical expression of the copyrighted work as the essential
element of the cause of action.
32
A copyright owner who contends that his rights have been
infringed must show both the defendant's access to the material
and the identity of the copyrighted original with the alleged
infringing copy.83 Intent to infringe need not be proved,34
and the test of similarity is not what the defendant intended
to represent, but whether the copying would be discernible by
the general public.85 Assuming that substantial appropriation
has been found, what appears on its face to be a clear case
of infringement may be defeated if the appropriation comes
within the doctrine of fair use.3
6
"Fair use" is not defined, nor even mentioned, in the Copy-
right Act,7 but the doctrine was recognized in England before
our laws were passed. 8 The term apparently originated in
31. Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); see 18 C.J.S. Copyright
and Literary Property § 92 (1939).
32. E.g., Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1878); Carr v. Nat'l Capital
Press, 71 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir.
1926.)
33. Carew v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1942);
Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
34. Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
35. Lewis v. Kroger Co., 109 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.W. Va. 1952); Barbo-
dillo v. Goldwyn, 42 F2d 881 (S.D. Cal. 1930); Roe-Lawton v. Hal E.
Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
36. Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950); Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851 (1947).
37. Compare Story v. Holconmbe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 175 (No. 13,497)
(C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (purported abridgement of Story's ComMENT IES ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE) with G. Ricordi & Co. v. Mason, 201 F. 182 (C.C.S.
D.N.Y. 1911) (preliminary injunction denied), 201 F. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1912)
(injunction denied), aff'd per curiam, 210 F. 277 (2d Cir. 1913) and Law-
rence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (controversy
between two editors of Henry Wheaton's ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw). But section 107 of the Copyright Law Revision Bill of 1967 would
expressly recognize the principle of fair use as a limitation on the exclusive
rights of the copyright proprietor under the provisions of section 106. H. R.
2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
38. In England the doctrine is now statutory and the phrase is "fair deal-
ing." The Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 46, § 2(1) (i), at 183
specifies that a copyright is not infringed by "any fair dealing with any work
for purposes of private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper sum-
mary." See Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch. 1761); Gyles v.
Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740). See also Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas.
171 173 (No. 13,497) (C.C.D. Ohio 1847); Tonson v. Walker, 36 Eng. Rep.101%, 1020 (Ch. 1752).
[Vol. 20
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1810 when, in the case of W =77ins v. Aikin,8 9 Lord Eldon con-
trasted what he called "fair quotation"
40 with the taking of
the "whole or part"41-meaning a substantial or material part-
of another's work. In isolating this concept that only the
taking of a substantial part is infringement, the English judges,
through a process of semantic evolution, came to refer to an
appropriation not substantial enough to infringe as "fair use."
'42
In 1878, Lord Hatherley in Chatterton v. Cave
8 said that "if
the quantity taken be neither substantial nor material, if, as
it has been expressed by some Judges, a 'fair use' only be made
of the publication, no wrong is done and no action can be
brought . . . ."44 Our courts, with similar language, adopted
the expression from the beginning.4 5 Definitions4 6 which have
been given by the authorities unhappily are at sixes and sevens
and provide little help in understanding the cases or drawing
the line between an infringing use and a "fair use"47 in any
particular case. Despite this definitional controversy, it should
prove useful to set forth one of the leading statements48 of the
39. 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (1810).
40. Id. at 164.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Scott v. Stanford, L.R. 3 Eq. 718 (1867); Jarrould v. Houl-
ston, 69 Eng. Rep. 1294, 1297 (1857); Lewis v. Fullarton, 48 Eng. Rep. 1080
(1839).
43. 3 App. Cas. 483 (1878).
44. Id. at 492.
45. Baker v. Selden. 101 U.S. 99 (1879); Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6
(N.D. Cal. 1896) ; Folsom v. Marsh, 2 F. Cas. 342, 343-44 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841); see AisnuR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 794 -82 (1936);
HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 125-217 (1952) ; 2 LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECIION or LITERARY PROPERTY 805-06 (1938); LINDLEY, PLAGIARISM AND
ORIGINAIzTY 1011 (1952) ; SPRING, RISKS AN) RIGHTS 176-88 (1952) ; 15 So.
CAL. L. REv. 249 (1942).
46. Scott, in his treatise on trusts, writes:
Even if it were possible to frame, an exact definition of a legal concept,
the definition would not be of great practical value.... All that one
can properly attempt to do is to give such a description of a legal con-
cept that others will know in a general way what one is talking about.
1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 2.3 (3d ed. 1967).
47. The difficulty of line drawing has prompted the prestigious Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit to conclude that "the issue of fair use... is
the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright ... " Dellar v. Samuel
Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
48. Well, fifty years ago, defined fair use as
simply a use which is legally permissive, either because of the scope of
a copyright, the nature of the work, or by reason of the application of
known commercial, social or professional usages, having the effect of
custom, insofar as these do not expressly run contrary to the plain
language of copyright legislation.
WEm, AmERIcAN COPYRIGHT LAw 429 (1917). In another formulation, fair
use is thought to be "technically forbidden by the law, but allowed as reason-
1968]
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doctrine of fair use, which has been adopted for purposes of
this paper:
Fair use may be defined as a privilege in others than the
owner of the copyright, to use the copyrighted material
in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstand-
ing the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright.
49
"Fair use," then, is the privileged use of copyrighted material
without express license.50
In the leading American case of Folsom v. Marsk,51 Mr.
Justice Joseph Story acknowledged that copyright "justifiable
use" issues "approach, nearer than any other class of cases
belonging to forensic discussions, . . . the metaphysics of the
law, where the distinctions are . . . very subtle and refined,
and, sometimes, almost evanescent."
52
It is often exceedingly obvious, that the whole substance
of one work has been copied from another, with slight
omissions and formal differences only, which can be treated
in no other way than as studied evasions; whereas, in other
cases, the identity of the two works in substance, and the
question of piracy often depend upon a nice balance of
the comparative use made in one of the materials of the
able and customary, on the theory that the author must have foreseen it and
tacitly consented to it." DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143
(1925). According to Cohen, the courts "generally give a functional definition
of fair use, speaking of it as the right to quote for purposes of criticism and
comment, or as the right of a writer to use an earlier work in preparing his
own." Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, in 6 COPYRIGHT L.
Symposium. 43, 58 (1955). In the case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,
45 F.2d 119, 121, (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931), Judge
Hand advanced the proposition that fair use is only a way of describing
insubstantial copying. Furthermore, he stated: "Then the question is whether
the part so taken is 'substantial', and therefore not a 'fair use' of the copy-
righted work; it is the same question as arises in the case of any other copy-
righted work." Cf. MacDonald v. DuMaurier, 144 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1944);
Selvin, Parody aid Burlesque of Copyrighted Works as Infringement, 6 BuLL.
COPYRIGHT Soc. 53, 60-62 (1958). In a later case Judge Hand spoke of fair
use "as copying the theme or ideas rather than their expression." Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. 81 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 669 (1936). Seemingly, the great judge was mistaken in confusing
"theme" or "ideas" with "expression." Since the former are not copyrightable,
their use is not a use of protected works. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
49. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944).
50. That there is some disagreement as to whether fair use is a privileged
infringement of copyright or whether fair use simply does not infringe the
copyright; however, the divergence in view seems to have no practical signifi-
cance.
51. 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
52. Id. at 344.
[Vol. 20
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other, the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus
used; the objects of each work; and the degrees to which
each writer may be fairly presumed to have resorted to
the same common sources of information, or to have exer-
cised the same common diligence in the selection and ar-
rangement of the materials. 53
The uncertainties involved in questions of fair use have led to
the general principle that the determination of "fair use" in
a given case is a pragmatic question to be considered in light of
all the facts of each case.54
A. Rationale for the Doctrine of Fair Use.
Before attempting to determine whether a particular use of
literary materials will be a fair use, it is necessary to examine
the rationale and primary considerations behind the doctrine
of fair use. More importantly, it should be determined to what
extent such a theoretical basis has been taken into account in
particular applications of the doctrine of fair use.
The common law right of an author to the exclusive owner-
ship of his literary work was acknowledged in England in
1662.55 By 1700, literary piracy in England was becoming a
national outrage.56 Swift, Addison, and Steele, as well as
several publishers who were alarmed by the trend, petitioned
Parliament for an act to protect their exclusive ownership
rights-.s This resulted in the passage of an act granting authors
protection for fourteen years against the infringement of their
published materials.53
Statutory protection of copyrights in the United States is
based on the English statute of 1709.19 Before the adoption
of the Constitution in 1787 twelve of the original thirteen
53. Id.
54. Matthews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943);
see DRONE, THE LAw oF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRoDucTIoNs 386 (1879).
55. CoPINGER & JAuEs, LAw oF COPYRIGHT 7 (8th ed. 1948).
56. Until the invention of the printing press and moveable type, around
1456, which made publishing a mass production industry, there was no need
for a set of legal rules.
57. See WINCOR, How TO SECURE COPYRIGHT 16 (1950).
58. 8 Anne, ch. 19, § 1 (1709); see SIEEar, FREEDOM OF THE PaSS IN
ENGLAND: 1476 to 1776, at 74 (1952).
59. Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. Rav. 203 (1954).
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colonies had enacted copyright statutes.6 0 Despite the near
universal opinion that the distinguished lexicographer Noah
Webster fathered the modern law of copyright, a careful reading
of dusty tomes indicates that the honor of paternity belongs
instead to Andrew Law and John Ledyard. 6 '
Connecticut passed the first copyright statute in 1783. Within
several months of the passage of this statute, the Continental
Congress appointed a committee "to consider the most proper
means of cherishing genius and useful arts throughout the
United States by securing to the authors or publishers of new
books their property in such works.162 That committee recom-
mended, and the Continental Congress adopted, a resolution
requesting all of the states to enact laws securing to authors
property rights in their works. All of the states but Delaware
responded by adopting copyright statutes similar to Connecti-
cut's.63
James Madison, together with Charles Pinckney, presented
to the Constitutional Convention the proposal for a power in
Congress "to secure to literary authors their copyright for a
limited time, to encourage by premiums and provisions, the
60. New York was the thirteenth and last of the original states to fall in line,
passing its law in April 1786. See Pforzheimer, Historical Perspective on
Copyright Law and Fair Use in REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHT LAW 18, 27
(Hattery & Bush ed. 1964).
61. In 1782, Webster was just completing his popular speller, THE GxR-
MATICAL INSTITUTE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE. His desire to assure protec-
tion for that famous work led him to seek protection for it in the legislatures
of the several states. The Webster myth which followed was the result of an
error by the House Committee on Patents in 1909, when it stated in its re-
port that "the first copyright statute ever passed in this country was passed
by the legislature of Connecticut in 1785 at the solicitation of Noah Webster,
who desired copyright protection for his spelling book." H. R. REP. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1909). In 1781 one Andrew Law petitioned the Con-
necticut Assembly, begging for the sole right of "imprinting and vending" his
book, COLLECTION OF THE BEST TUNES [FOR THE PROMOTION OF PSALMODY] OF
Na.w HAvEx. The Connecticut Legislature granted his plea. In January 1783
John Ledyard, an explorer with the famous Captain James Cook sought pro-
tection for the exclusive publication rights of his JOURNAL OF CAPTAIN COOi'S
LAST VOYAGE TO THE PACIFIC OCEAN. In granting this protection the Connect-
icut Legislature recommended that:
as it appears that several Gentlemen of Genius & reputation are also
about to make similar Applications for the exclusive right [to] publish
Works of their Respective Compositions, your Committee are of the
opinion that it is expedient to pass a general bill, for that purpose and
thereupon report the Annexed Bill.
LEHIAN-HAUPT with GRANNIs & WRATH, THE BOOK IN AERICA 90 (1939).
62. 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 180 (G.P.O.).
63. See generally BOWATER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND LAW 8-28 (1912);
COPINGER & JAMES, THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT 1-21 (8th ed. 1948); LEHMAN-
HAUPT with GRANNIS & WRATH, THE BOOK IN AMERICA (1939); PUTNAM,
THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT 355-64 (3d ed. 1904); Solverg, Copyright Law
Reforn, 35 YALE L.J. 48 (1925).
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advancement of useful knowledge and discoveries.164 The result
was Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution. This was
the source of Congressional power for the Act of 1790 and all
later copyright legislation. It ended the need for state copy-
right legislation. 5 The third revision of the copyright laws in
1909, repealing the laws of 1831 and 1870, provided for an
original copyright of 28 years with a period of renewal of 28
years,66 and, except for minor amendments, provided the basis
for copyright law as it is today. A much-needed revision is
assured for the not too distant future.
67
The primary purpose for copyright protection is the public
good. Hence, the most useful justification for fair use is phrased
in terms of the constitutional scheme of which it is a part.
In the words of the Constitution, copyright legislation shall
"promote the Progress of Science and useful At."6s Any
judicial limitation placed on this constitutional grant, such as
the fair use doctrine, 9 must have a basis in some important
underlying policy. Lord Mansfield in 1785 stated such a policy:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally
prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have em-
ployed their time for the service of the community, may
not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of
their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may
not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the
64. 5 DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTIiTTioN 439-40 (Eliot ed. 1907);
WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CoNsTITuTIo N 625, n. 1 (1928).
65. Congress has plenary authority in such matters. Wollen v. Banker, 30
F. Cas. 603 (No. 18,030) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1877).
66. Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
67. See H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (Copyright Law Revi-
sion Bill).
68. U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 8. See also H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1909).
69. Latman seems to offer a theory of "consent" enforced by the figurative
bargain embodied in the securing of a statutory copyright, Latman, Fair Use of
Copyrighted Works, Study No. 14 in COPYRIGHT LAW REvIsIoN: STUDiEs
PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMMITEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1958), in place of the unsatisfactory implied consent doctrine. His
explanation goes like this:
[A]s a condition of obtaining the statutory grant, the author is deemed
to consent to certain reasonable uses of his copyrighted work to promote
the ends of public welfare for which he was granted copyright. The
theory of "enforced consent" . . . relies more directly upon the con-
stitutional purpose of copyright . . . . A certain degree of latitude for
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arts be retarded. The act that secures copyright to authors
guards against the piracy of words and sentiments; but
it does not prohibit writing on the same subject."
0
The use of copyrighted material, then, is permitted when the
public will benefit from the author's work, without that use
seriously discouraging progress of the art or greatly injuring
the artist. It is a balancing of social value against detriment to
the artist.
It is for the public benefit that reasonable copying of copy-
right works is allowed. This basic public policy is also behind
the courts' denial of proprietorship rights in ideas. Ideas are
the common property of mankind and may be copied."' An
author acquires only the right to the manner he takes to express
his ideas, and even his mode of expression may be reasonably
copied under the doctrine of fair use.
This policy involves the reconciliation of what seem to be
two conflicting interests: the right of the author to retain
complete control over his works and the right of the general
public to gain the benefit of the work. In theory, however,
these two desires can be said to merge since the reward granted
the author will induce him to make public the fruits of his
intellectual harvest.72 Even for writers for whom the commercial
incentive is not necessary because they create simply for the
ecstacsy of creation, Mr. Justice Wille's dictum is apropos:
It is wise in any state, to encourage letters and the painful
researches of learned men. The easiest and most equal
way of doing it, is, by securing to them the property of
their own works....
A writer's fame will not be the less, that he has bread,
without being under the necessity of prostituting his pen
to flattery ....
70. Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (1785).
71. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879). "The very object of publishing
a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the use-
ful knowledge which it contains." The forms in a form book may be copied,
for example. Cases in this area are often decided on the theory that
the presumed intention of the author is to allow certain uses of the work.
"When the plaintiff put on the general market a book of forms, he implied
the right to their private use. This conclusion follows from the nature of a
book of forms. No one reads them as literature; their sole use is in their
usability." American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146,
147 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
72. See U. S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947).
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He who engages in a laborious task ... will do it with
more spirit, if, besides his own glory, he thinks it may be
a provision for his family.
73
Nevertheless, to the extent that the two interests are inconsistent
in practice,74 priority must be given to the public because "the
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the
owner a secondary consideration." 75 Encouragement of literary
and other intellectual labors for the public interest will be
furthered by allowing subsequent fair use of a copyrighted work
without the consent of the copyright holders.76 Every determina-
tion of fair use must ultimately rest on this rationale.
There is more to copyright, however, than the purpose of
disseminating learning. There is also the method by which
that purpose is to be achieved. This is what the Supreme Court
has called the "economic philosophy behind the clause-the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the
talents of authors and inventors .... 1,77 The concept of copy-
right is itself a practical method of reconciling the two com-
peting desires for free availability of learning and encourage-
ment of individual effort by opportunity for personal gain.
Another explanation postulates that fair use arises out of
the "implied consent" of the author to a reasonable use of his
works.78 While one may meaningfully speak of the implied
73. Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 218 (1769).
74. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),
modified, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958). Judge
Hinclks decision, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), is well worth reading. See also
47 CALiF. L. REv. 174 (1959).
75. U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1947). In Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932), the Court pointed out that a copy-
right, like a patent, is at once the equivalent given by the public for benefits
bestowed by the genius, meditations, and skills of individuals and for the
incentive to further efforts for the same important objectives. See also Becker
v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1944).
76. Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). "The right of
subsequent authors, publishers and the general public to use the works of
others to a limited extent has always been universally recognized as consistent
with the object of publication and the policy of encouraging the dissemination
of knowledge, learning and culture . . BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRGHT
AND LITERARY PROPERTY 259 (1944).
77. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
78. See, e.g., Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539,
541 (1st Cir. 1905) ; American Institutee of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp.
146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.
Wis. 1941) ; Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp.
302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938). See also 2 LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIO
OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 805 (1938).
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consent of the author to having his book read, sold, or criticized
by a purchaser,79 and a few other uses, 0 in most cases this
implication of consent appears fictitious and unsuited for a
rational system of jurisprudence. If fair use is premised "on
the theory that the author must have foreseen it and tacitly
consented to it,"''1 an author should be able to withdraw these
rights by appropriate notice contained in the work.8 2  The
results of a comprehensive study of literary materials published
within the last ten years, supported by interviews with in-
terested parties, shows that it is simply standard operating
procedure to carry a reservation of all rights in the name of
the copyright owner.8 3 Pragmatically, these findings alone
would undermine the implied consent theory. Copyright, how-
ever, is not a consensual undertaldng, and the intent of the
parties is not an essential factor.
84
Where the use is only "incidental"8' 5 or where the work is
not of a scholarly nature,s the maxim de minimus no curat
Zew provides a basis for fair use. This underlying rationale
79. See Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Cooperman, 218 F. 577 (2d Cir. 1914).
80. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880) (use of a bookkeep-
ing system); American Institute of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146,
147 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (use of forms from architectural contract form book) ;
Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (use
of a song dedicated to a professional football team in an article about the
team); G. Recordi & Co. v. Mason, 201 F. 182 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911) (prelim-
inary injunction denied), 201 F. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (injunction denied).
81. DEWoLPE, AN OUTUNE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925). It is suggested
that this is nothing more than constitutional doctrine in contract clothing.
82. The following legend is illustrative of restrictive intent:
Copyright 1963, by Yale University. All rights reserved. This book may
not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (except by review-
ers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers.
An interesting express indication of the authors' intentions is seen set forth
below:
Copyright 1964, by George P. Bush. George P. Bush will not enforce
his copyright after January 1, 1970. Permission to copy the whole or
part of this document is hereby granted to those who wish to use
such copies in educational works, professional journals, as well as in an
information handling storage or retrieval system. Permission to others to
copy is governed by "Fair Use."
83. Detailed analysis of the conclusions of this research, undertaken coinci-
dent with this paper, are available upon request to the author.
84. See Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYMGHT L. SYmPO-
sium 43, 61 (1955): "'Implied consent' is really no more than convenient
fiction ....
85. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1934).
86. See, e.g., Bloom v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903) ; ef. Johnstone
v. Bernard Jones Publications, Ltd., [1938] 1 Ch. 599.
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early became embodied in the precedent87 of equity courts
where many fair use cases arose. Since the court did not want
to encourage such nuisance suits where the amount taken was
not very large, the Chancellor could refuse to issue an injunc-
tion if there was no clear showing of substantial injury to the
plaintiff. 8  Today this reluctance is an anachronism 9 under
modern practice where the same court can award damages at
law as well as an injunction and other equitable remedies. Al-
though the Copyright Act provides that "all the copyrightable
component parts of the work copyrighted" 90 shall be protected,
the courts have engrafted upon the law the doctrine that in-
fringement may be said to mean substantial appropriation of
copyrighted material.91 Where an action for infringement was
brought, it was the rule that substantial appropriation must
be shown to obtain relief.9 2 Since the doctrine of substantial
appropriation is applied in infringement actions it should not
enter into the question of fair use. By the same token if the
taking is not sufficient enough to be substantial, the issue of
fair use would not arise.98
Custom94 or customary usage95 has also been suggested as a
basis for the doctrine. At the one extreme, a plaintiff copy-
right owner should not be forestalled from relief solely because
prior potential plaintiffs have not chosen to exercise their
rights. But at the other extreme, writers (potential defendants)
87. Early fair use cases brought in equity include Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F.
Cas. 26 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869); Lewis v. Fullarton, 48 Eng. Rep.
1080) (Rolls Ct. 1839) ; Mawman v. Tegg, 38 Eng. Rep. 380 (Ch. 1826).
88. Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYmPOsIUm
43, 50 (1955).
89. Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1964) provides that actions for in-
junction, damages and profits may be combined.
90. Id. § 1 (1964) (emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d
579 (9th Cir. 1944); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d
45 (2d Cir. 1939); aff'd 309 U.S. 390 (1940); Ansehl v. Puritan Pharmacy
Co., 61 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932) ; Chatter-
ston v. Cave, 3 App. Cas. 483 (1878); Bohn v. Bogue, 7 L.T. (o.s.) 277
(1846).
92. See, e.g., Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 144 F. 83, 84 (7th Cir.
1906), aft'd, 209 U.S. 20 (1908); See Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protec-
tion, 64 HAnv. L. REv. 1125, 1127 (1951).
93. See note 50 & accompanying text supra.
94. See 15 So. CAL. L. REv. 249, 250 (1942).
95. See Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch. 1761); BALL, COPY-
RIGHT AND LImRRY PROPERTY 260 (1944); DEWoLFE, AN OTMruu OF CoPY-
RIGHT LAw 143 (1925); Wrau, AmRcAN COPYRIGHT LAw 429-30 (1917).
But see Walter v. Steinkopff [1892] 3 Ch. 489, which held that custom could
not control the law.
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should be able to feel secure from legal liability when following
long established reasonable practices of their art. Although the
potential plaintiff may be deterred from litigation, the existence
of a custom does not explain the existence of the doctrine of
fair use.00 One court has stated that fair use is such use as
is "reasonable and customary," 97 but it does not follow that
a use must be customary to be a privileged fair use. It is
crystal clear that novel use which is a departure from custom
may be embraced within the doctrine if it meets the established
judicial criteria.
In summary, it seems that these theories are subordinated to,
and are a part of, the rationale that "fair use is all use dedi-
cated to the public by the nature of statutory copyright.
9 8
The virtue of these other theories lies in helping courts, in
appropriate fact situations, to implement this policy.
B. Types of Use Recognized.
Certain types of appropriations have traditionally come under
the shelter of the fair use defense. A review of the more
characteristic situations will reveal the various criteria of fair
use, how they interact, and how the cases overlap.
Scholarly Works. Scholarly works concerned with literature,
science and the arts generally may be appropriated if the orig-
inal form is not taken. 9 The foundation for this general rule
is that the object of a scholarly work is to give to the world
the knowledge it contains. If this cannot be accomplished with-
out liability, the policy is frustrated, and "the progress of
science and the useful arts" is greatly impeded.100 For example,
when the substance of a work cannot be conveyed without the
methods and diagrams contained therein, they are considered
as necessary incidents and given to the public. The privilege
96. Cohen, Fair use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SYMPosIUM
43, 51 (1955).
97. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1934).
98 SHAW, LIyRAny PROPERTY IN THE UmT STATEs 67 (1950). Shaw
finds that the inherent nature of the copyright laws require that an author
"dedicate" a certain portion of his work to the public in return for his
statutory protection.
99. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
100. "Writers of books would be deprived of the proper growth in knowl-
edge, and from taking advantage of the position to which earlier writers had
carried the science under consideration." West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson
& Co., 169 F. 833, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1909).
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of fair use cannot, however, be used under this theory to justify
the lifting of entire scenes from a dramatic work.101
The extent of the application of the fair use doctrine in
this area is indicated by one court as follows: "[T]his doctrine
permits a writer of scientific, legal, medical and similar books
or articles of learning to use even the identical words of earlier
books or writings dealing with the same subject matter.'
10 2
This latitude is well established'03 and comprehends such areas
as law,104 medicine, 105 science,' 06 history'07 and biography.
08
Furthermore, it seems the courts will go a long way to find
that a particular field is scientific or professional. In S'imns
v. Stanton'09 it was stated that "physiognomy, the art of read-
ing faces, deserved recognition as a science," 10 and the court
found that there was a fair use made of the plaintiff's work
on the subject. In any event, the court's characterization of a
work as scholarly or news or the like is an extremely significant
and often decisive factor."-'
One of the most difficult problems is the characterizing of
scholarly works in the law book field 1 2 where similar cita-
101. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
1947) (series of 57 consecutive comedy scenes, constituting 20% of the feature,
were appropriated; claim of "borrowing ideas" was denied) ; Sheldon v. Metro-
Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 397 (1940) (taking represented the
entire development of a play).
102. Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
103. "With reference to works in regard to the arts and sciences, using
those words in the broadest sense .... [a]uthors are sometimes entitled,
indeed, required to make use of what precedes them in the precise form in
which last exhibited .... " (emphasis added). Sampson & Murdock Co. v.
Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905).
104. See, e.g., Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888); see W. H. Ander-
son Co. v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928); West Pub.
Co. v. Edward Thompson & Co., 176 F. 833 (2d Cir. 1910).
105. See, e.g., Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.
Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
106. See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896).
107. See, e.g., Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F2d 598 (7th
Cir. 1957).
108. See, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
109. 75 F. 6 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896).
110. Id. at 10. See also Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d
598, 604 (2d Cir. 1957), where the court treated a TRUE MAGAZINE article
on the death of Lincoln as an "historical writing."
111. See Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
112. See Loew's, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 175, (S.D. Cal. 1955)
(decisions called "somewhat confusing" by Judge Carter); affd Jub nor.
Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd inem. by an equally
divided Court sub. nor. CBS v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
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tionsll8 and case lists" 4 are found in two or more legal
books." 5 The problem arises, in part, from the necessity of
categorizing the various legal publications according to the
nature of the work-that is, determining whether they are
professional textbooks or whether they are mere case digests
or compilations. In the latter event, even the verification of
the original case list will not screen the defendant from liability
under the doctrine of fair use.1'0 It is suggested that from a
policy standpoint it is sound to permit greater appropriation
from textbooks and treatises than from mere case digests and
compilations."
7
The fact that the case digests, containing case lists and anno-
tations, are in direct competition with each other is another
reason for limiting the copying of case lists and annotations
from prior works. A compilation by necessity does not afford
an opportunity for variety in the statement of the information
recorded; moreover, it is difficult to avoid mere copying. The
issue resolves itself into the following: What independent work
did subsequent compilers do to acquire the requisite material?
Despite allowing a subsequent compiler to make limited use
of the original compilation as a source" s or check," 9 it seems
he must disregard the assistance of the original compilation
after using it as a means of verification. 20  One court viewed
these cases as resting
more upon the idea of unfair use, and the unlawful saving
113. See, Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922
(2d Cir. 1903).
114. See White v. Bender, 185 F. 921 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1911).
115. See W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F2d 82 (6th
Cir. 1928); West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson & Co., 176 F. 833 (2d Cir.
1910) ; Edward Thompson & Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F.2d 922 (2d
Cir. 1903); West Pub. Co. v. Lawyers Co-op Pub. Co., 79 F. 756 (2d Cir.
1897).
116. W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir.
1928).
117. In W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F2d 82, 89
(6th Cir. 1928), it was said that
greater latitude is to be expected in the case of authors consulting other
text books or using directories and lists than in the case of one com-
piler attempting to make use of another similar compilation.
118. See Social Register Ass'n v. Murphy, 128 F. 116 (C.C.D.R.I. 1904)
cf. Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion Modeling, Inc.,
105 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
119. See Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 144 F. 83 (7th Cir. 1906).
120. Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539 (1st Cir.
1905); see Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory & Publishing Co.
146 F. 332 (C.C.D. Conn. 1906), which called for an independent effort.
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of labor in order to avoid the necessary original research
than upon the appropriation of any literary ideas or ar-
rangement, based upon literary ability and studied plan.121
That this has been a troublesome area is evidenced by the split
in authority.12 2
It may be that the key issue in each case centers around the
nature of the infringing work. In Henry Holt & 0o. v. Liggett &
Myers Tobacco Co.,1 23 the court held that the defendant's use of
three sentences from a scientific treatise in an advertisement was
not for scholarly purposes for which the plaintiff's consent might
be implied:
[The defendant's] publication was not one in the field in
which Dr. Felderman wrote, nor was it a scientific treatise
or a work designed to advance human knowledge. On the
contrary, it is clear that its pamphlet intended to advance
the sale of its product-Chesterfield cigarettes-a purely
commercial purpose. 24
Literary and Dramatic Reviews and Commentaries. By far
the most common application of the fair use doctrine occurs
in situations in which material has been appropriated for use
in literary and dramatic reviews and commentaries. 125 1Mr.
Justice Story, in 1841, said: "[N]o one can doubt a reviewer
may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design
be really and truly to use the passage for purposes of fair and
reasonable criticism.' 126 It was early recognized in England
that quoting the exact text for the purpose of criticism was a
fair use.127 Use of copyrighted work for critical purposes
doesn't seem to be confined to literary criticism only; this type
of fair use also extends to dramatic criticism, editorial com-
121. West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson & Co., 169 F. 833, 853 (C.C.E.
D.N.Y. 1909), modified 176 F. 833 (2d Cir. 1910).
122. Compare Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539
(1st Cir. 1905) with Edward Thompson & Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122
F. 922 (2d Cir. 1903). At least independent effort and judgment must be
exercised. List Pub. Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887); cf. Jewel-
er's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
123. 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
124. Id. at 304; accord, Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y.
1950).
125. See ADisuu, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PAcimC 757 (1937).
126. Folsom v. Marsh, 2 F. Cas. 342, 343 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass.
1841).
127. Bell v. Whitehead, 8 L.J. (n.s.) 141 (1839).
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ment, and to mimicry and parodies.1 -28 In Lawrence v. Dana,129
Mr. Justice Clifford, following Folsam v. Marsk'80 faithfully,
stated the principle of this application thusly:
Reviewers may make extracts sufficient to show the merits,
or demerits of the work, but they cannot so exercise the
privilege as to supersede the original book. Sufficient [ex-
tracts] may be taken to give a correct view of the whole;
but the privilege of making extracts is limited to those
objects, and cannot be exercised to such an extent that the
review shall become a substitute for the book reviewed.'
31
Lawrence v. Dana states the two most important factors
132
in fair use: (1) the value of the copied portion of the work
and (2) the review's effect as tending to supersede or become a
substitute for the original. The test does not place a limit on the
quantity taken; a quoted amount is permissible if it enables the
reviewer to evaluate the work.' 33 The criterion is sometimes
stated to be whether the review has copied so much that it will
reduce the demand for the original.134 The reduction in demand
must result from the fact that the criticism discloses too fully the
contents of the original, but not because it is adverse. 135 For in-
stance, when the defendant copied word lists for use by students,
the use was not fair because both works met the same marked de-
mand and "defendant's copying was unquestionably to avoid the
trouble or expense of an independent work."' 86 This reduction
128. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q.
40 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (dictum). "Dramatic criticism is one of the most common
forms of 'fair use.' Mimicry, editorial comment, and parodies are other vari-
ties or instances of 'fair use.'" Id. at 42. However, it is doubtful whether
mimicry and parody are automatically accepted by the courts as an instance of
fair use.
129. 15 F. Cas. 26 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869). For the background
on this case see HicKs, MEN AND Booxs FAMOUS IN THE LAW 223-34 (1921).
130. 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). This case, following
the English cases, did not place a limit upon the quantity to be used. The
quoted amount is permissible if sufficient to enable the commentator to
analyze correctly the work. Subsequent cases have emphasized this point.
131. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
132. See also Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (No. 13,497) (C.C.D.
Ohio 1847); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass.
1841); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914);
Bell v. Whitehead, 8 L.J. (n.s.) 141 (1839); Wittingham v. Wooler, 36 Eng.
Rep. 679 (1817).
133. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
See note 138 supra.
134. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
135. Id.
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in demand factor seen here is in reality an "economic detriment"
test and is often used as a measurement of substantial appro-
priation in infringement cases,137 though more properly rele-
gated to the question of fair use.
Greater freedom is permitted writers in unrelated fields than
is permitted competitors.138 Even so, the courts seldom find
fair use where the material is used for commercial gain, rather
than an artistic purpose. In one case, the use of three sentences
from a medical book for the purpose of advertising was held
unfair because of the importance of the material. 8 9 If the
copied portion is necessary for a review or criticism of a book
in other publications, the use is fair, regardless of the quantity
taken; but if the appropriation stems from the desire for com-
mercial benefit, the use is unfair, again regardless of quantity.140
This distinction is grounded on the theory that an author in-
vites reviews and comments; they are necessary to the success
of his work, and if the work is scientific, others may build upon
it as a basis for further progress. Neither is involved when the
appropriation is made to secure financial gain to the borrower.
The case of Alexander v. Irving Trust 6o.141 presents an
element not usually involved in the determination of fair use
as it relates to editorial comment and criticism. In this case
the plaintiff alleged that a two-page article she had caused
to be published in a medical journal, entitled Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Psychiatrist, was infringed by the defendant's 270-page
book entitled The Psychiatric Novels of Oliver Wendell Holmes.
The court found no appropriation; at most there was a borrow-
ing of ideas. 42 The usual determination of fair use concerns
the originator of certain work and the borrower. Here, the
137. This appears to have come into the substantial appropriation area
through the citation of fair use cases in questions of infringement. For example,
the simple infringement case of Universal Pictures Corp. v. Harold Lloyd
Corp., 162 F2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947) cites the familiar fair use case of West
Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson & Co., 169 F. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1909). Some
courts have used substantial appropriation and fair use as the same thing. See
e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936).
138. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
139. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302
(E.D. Pa. 1938). See text at note 124, upra.
140. Id. There is also a fair use when the material is appropriated for use
in the advancement of scientific knowledge. E.g., Sampson & Murdock Co. v.
Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905).
141. 132 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 228 F.2d 221 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 996 (1956).
142. Id. at 369.
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court seems to indicate that the statements were "a fair use of
comments"'143 in that they did not injure "third-parties'"144
(plaintiffs') rights. This determination of fair use seems more
akin to tort law than to copyright law.
145
In sum, it is clear that the right of comment and criticism
is limited to what is reasonable. The leading case is Folsom v.
Marsh,148 in which the Reverend Charles W. Upham derived
over forty per cent of his Life of Washington in the Form of an
Autobiography from Jared Spark's twelve-volume masterpiece,
Writings of President Washington. In answer to the defendant's
assertion that the use was for the purpose of criticism, Mr.
Justice Story pointed out that if important parts of the orig-
inal were taken, not for the purpose of criticism, but for the
purpose of superseding the work, it would constitute "a piracy
pro tanto.1147 A finding of unfair use is often made in cases
in which the new work will tend to become a substitute for
the original with the resulting unjust deprivation of the original
author's rights.148 But criticism used as cover for substantial
appropriation for commercial purposes where the critique is
only incidental or even unintended is in a different category.149
InwidentaZ Use. The courts have also applied the fair use
doctrine where the original work was used in a purely inci-
dental manner. In Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co.,150 the court
found an implied "invitation" to use a copyrighted song which
had been dedicated to the Green Bay Packers professional foot-
ball team and adopted as the team's official fight song. In
an article in the Saturday Evening Post about the team, the
song was referred to and the eight lines of the chorus repro-
duced. In granting a motion to dismiss, the court said that
the article did not compete with the song, nor was the value
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. The privilege of fair comment or criticism in copyright law is
analogous to the libel and slander law privilege of fair comment on things of
public concern. For a discussion of the libel and slander privilege see W.
PRossER, HANDBOOK O THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 109, 110 (3d ed. 1964).
146. 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
147. Id. at 343.
148. See Macmillan v. King, 223 F. 862 (D.C. Mass. 1914); Ginn & Co. v.
Apollo Pub. Co., 215 F. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
149. Sayers v. Spaeth, Cop. OFF. BuLL. (No. 20,625) (S.D.N.Y. 1932);
Campbell v. Scott, 59 Eng. Rep. 784 (1842); University of London Press v.
University Tutorial Press, [1916] 2 ch. 601; Smith v. Chatto, 31 LJ. (n.s.)
775 (1874).
150. 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
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ol the song diminished since the author impliedly "consented
to a reasonable use thereof associated with the Packers."'
151
Similarly, the New Yorker published a story upon the death
of silent screen star Pearl White and quoted twelve lines from
the chorus of a humorous song entitled Poor Pauline, which
had been associated with the actress. In Broadway Music Corp.
v. F-P Pu7lishing Corp.152 the use was found to be a fair one
even though it constituted most of the article. These factors
were considered: (a) the extent and relative value of the ex-
tract, (b) the purpose of the borrowing work, (c) the quoted
portions used as a substitute for the original, and (d) the
effect on the distribution of the original work.153
In another case where the copied material was used only in-
cidentally in the borrowing work, the court held that the use
of a popular song to set the mood for a short story was fair
use. 15 4 "There could not have been any direct falling off of
the sales of the printed copies of the song,"' 5 5 reasoned the
court, "because of any competition from this story."'5 (6
PersonaZ or Private Use. May one appropriate copyrighted
materials for purposes of private and personal use? Professors
Kaplan and Brown conclude that when one makes a handwritten
copy for personal purposes he does not infringe the copy-
right.' 57 One writer has stated "private use is completely out-
side the scope and intent of restriction by copyright."'5 5
A different matter presents itself when the issue is whether
a library may reproduce a work in order to make it available
to users of the library.15 9 Another variation is where an in-
dividual for his private enjoyment tape records a copyrighted
musical composition.160 Latman poses the problem as follows:
151. Id. at 837.
152. 31 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
153. Id. at 818.
154. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1934).
155. Id. at 41.
156. Id.
157. KAPLAN & BROWN, CASES ON COPYIGHT 314 (1960); see Cohen, Fair
Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT L. SyPosIum 43, 58 (1955).
But cf. WElL, AmICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 406 (1917).
158. Shaw, Publication and Distribution of Scientific Literature, 17 COLLEGE
AND RESEAncH LimBaREs 294, 301 (1956).
159. See KAPLAN & BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 314 (1960).
160. See id. at 314, nIl.
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The increasing use of photoduplication processes will un-
doubtedly require continuing attention to the area .... It
may well be... that the purpose and nature of a private
use, and in some cases the small amount taken, might lead
a court to apply the general principles of fair use in such
a way as to deny liability.'""
Because of the lack of authority in this area, it is not certain
what the trend will be.
Parody and Burlesque. The terms parody and burlesque are
used interchangeably 62 although there are technical differences
between the two. Parody has been defined as follows:
A writing in which the language and style of an author
or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule
often with certain peculiarities greatly heightened or exag-
gerated.' 0 3
The same lexicographer defines burlesque this way:
A literary composition or dramatic representation that
ridicules something, usually the serious and dignified . . .
but sometimes the trivial and commonplace . . . by means
of grotesque exaggeration or comic imitation.0 4
While a parody follows closely the style of the author, applying
lofty phrases to inconsequential subjects, burlesque is simply
travesty and distortion.'0 l  The essence of both is criticism
through making fun of the writer, characters or incidents of
the work which is the subject. The terms will be considered
synonymous for the purposes of this paper.
161. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Study No. 14 in COPYRIGHT
LAw REvisioN: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMMTTE ON THE JUDI-
crAny, 86th CONG., 1st SEss. 12 (1958).
162. See Loew's, Inc. v. C.B.S., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub
non. Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd inem. by evenly
divided Court sub nor. C.B.S. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958). See also,
Columbia Pictures Corp. v. N.B.C., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
163. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1643 (1961).
See also KITCHIN, SURVEY OF BURLESQUE AND PARODY IN ENGLISH (1931);
WELLS' PARODY ANTHOLOGY XXV (1904).
164. WEnSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicTIoNARY 299 (1961).
165. Yannvich, Parody and Burlesque it the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B.
REV. 1130, 1131 (1955).
[Vol. 20
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Cases involving parody and burlesque are scant in number
and most of these opinions are unenlightening.166  At least
three of the cases in this area involved a mimicry or "take-off"
which, strictly speaking, was not a use of a copyrightable
component part of a work at all.
16 7
In a later case' 68 a stage presentation entitled Nutt and (-hiff,
imitating the cartoon characters Mutt and Jeff, was held to be
an infringement. Defendant claimed his performance was priv-
ileged as a parody. In granting an injunction the court said:
A copyrighted work is subject to fair criticism, serious or
humorous. So far as is necessary to that end, quotations
may be made from it, and it may be described by words,
representations, pictures or suggestions. It is not always
easy to say where the line should be drawn between the
use for which such purposes is permitted and that which
is forbidden.
One test which, when applicable, would seem to be ordi-
narily decisive, is whether or not so much as [sc] has
been reproduced as will materially reduce the demand for
the original.... The reduction in demand ... must result
from the partial satisfaction of that demand by the al-
leged infringing production. A criticism of the original
work, which lessened its money value by showing that it
was not worth seeing or hearing, could not give any right of
action for infringement of copyright.'6 9
Such reduction in demand was found here.170
166. Superficial approaches to the problem were made in Hill v. Whalen &
Martell Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Green v. Mingensheimer, 177 F.
286 (C.C.N.Y. 1909); Green v. Luby 177 F. 287 (C.C.N.Y. 1909); Bloom
v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C. Pa. 19035; Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co.,
[1916] 1 ch. 261. See also CLARE, COPYRIGHT AND INDUsTRiAL DFSIGN 63,
83 (1951) ; COPINGER & SxoNE, LAW OF COPYRIGHT 129, 131-32 (8th ed. 1948) ;
8 HALsBuR1s LAWS OF ENGLAxD § 786, at 433m, n.(d) (3d ed. Lord Simonds
1954) ; WEIL, AmERiCAN COPYRIGHT LAW §§ 1134, at 430 & 1142 at 432 (1917).
167. Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) ; Green v. Mingensheimer,
177 F. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) ; Bloom v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
168. Hill v. Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
169. Id. at 360.
170. Nutt and Griff was outright imitation of the original; another court
has interpreted this case as finding direct reproduction. King Features Syndi-
cate v. Flesher, 299 F. 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1924) (Copyright of a cartoon fea-
turing "Barney Google and Spark Plug" or "Sparky" [a horse] infringed
by a doll called "Sparky", an exact reproduction of the cartoon horse). See
19681
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Two recent cases involving television burlesque or skits of
movies constitute the real case law on the question of burlesque
being a fair use. In Loew's Ino. v. CBS,171 an injunction was
granted enjoining Jack Benny from parodying the movie
Gasight on his television program. The court concluded that
there had been a substantial taking from plaintiff's original
work, and from this infringement was found. District Judge
Carter, speaking for the court, seemed to place undue stress
upon the fact that defendants were using the burlesque "for
commercial gain in a competing entertainment field."172 Judge
Carter concluded:
Plaintiff's have a property right in "Gaslight" which de-
fendants may not legally appropriate under the pretense
that burlesque as fair use justifies a substantial taking;
that parodized or burlesque taking is to be treated no dif-
ferently from any other appropriating; that as in all other
cases of alleged taking, the issue becomes first one of fact,
i.e., what was taken and how substantial was the taking;
and if it is determined that there was a substantial taking,
infringement exists.
173
Although the holding for plaintiff could have been based
on the ground that the burlesque was a mere subterfuge for
appropriating the original work, this was not stated in the
opinion.' 74 Rather, the theory was that there could be no im-
munity on the ground of fair use and that parody must be
treated in the same manner as a serious taking. 75 A rigid
application of this theory would make parody and burlesque
an infringement in nearly every case. In the appropriation of
Note, The Protection Afforded Literary and Cartoon Characters, 68 HARv.
L. Rav. 349, 356-63 (1954).
[Cartoons] are the most advantageous form in which to embody anything
designed for copyright .. ., [for] what is being protected in these car-
toon by-product cases is neither an idea, a character, nor a design but a
popularity value, a sort of psychological property.
Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 932, 939 (1939).
171. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub norn. Benny v. Loew's, Inc.,
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956); aff'd nem. by an equally dizided Court sub
now. CBS v. Loew's, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
172. Id. at 182.
173. Id. at 183.
174. See Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33
CAN. B. REv. 1130, 1149-50 (1955).
175. 131 F. Supp. 165, 182 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
176. See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Fields, 210 F. 864, 865 (2d Cir. 1914).
[Vol. 20
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serious material, the taking of two or three scenes is an in-
fringement.17 6 If the doctrine of fair use is eliminated from the
parody situation and the usual rules applied, all parody and
burlesque would necessarily have to be considered infringement
per se. The parody "would inevitably have to be cast in the
form of the original."'1 77 If the original is not recognized in
the parodying work as it is, there is no parody at all, or at the
most, an extremely poor one. If the original is not recognized
by the audience, it is not possible to mock, spoof or poke fun
at it; the basis of the humor is destroyed. If the test nor-
mally applied to serious work were applied to parody, it would
eliminate altogether true parody and burlesque. In any case,
it would severely limit the fair use concept, and then the literary
history of parody and burlesque would lose all meaning.
The court placed undue stress upon the fact that defendants
were using the burlesque for commercial purposes.' 7 8 Commer-
cial gain through parody goes back to the beginnings of the
form itself. The fact that the property value of the holder has
risen greatly in value in modern times, and similarly, that the
parody or burlesque will command much greater remuneration
for its creator, should not obscure the primary consideration of
the Copyright Act which is to promote the progress of arts
and sciences. Financial gain to the copyright holder is not
primary, but secondary, in light of this policy.
Although commercial factors are certainly considered in ques-
tions of infringement, the better view would seem to be that
the doctrine of fair use should be applied where there is slight
likelihood of economic detriment to the original author or
where the value of the borrowing work is sufficient to justify
any detriment.179 The parody situation appears to justify the
application of fair use. In the "Gaslight" case, for example,
any proof tending to show that the parody affected adversely
the rentals of the film'80 was so speculative that it is useless
to consider it. As there was no direct competition between
177. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B.
REv. 1130, 1144-45 (1955).
178. 131 F. Supp. 165, 182, 184 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
179. The use of this test alone would deny recovery to the plaintiff where
the circumstances prevented his proving economic injury, even though there
may have been appropriation. However, this test has some significance since a
stimulus to artistic production is within the constitutional policy.
180. Damages, if any, would have to be to foreign distribution and to re-
issue value of the picture.
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the two works, any likelihood of actual impairment of sales
resulting in economic detriment to the plaintiff was remote.
In reality, the publicity received through the parody probably
enhanced the value of the property.
The second case, CBS v. NBC,""' which was tried in the same
court with the same judge, involved a Sid Caesar skit entitled
From Here to Obscurity, which was a burlesque of the motion
picture From Here to Eternity. Caesar's reliance upon the form
and substance of the original was not so extensive as was
Benny's; however, setting, general situation, underlying themes
and plots, and details of development of the story line were
used and obviously recognizable in the parody. 8 2 The plot of
the skit, combining two of the underlying themes of the movie,
was changed in vital respects to conform to the comic purpose
of the parody. Plot, sequence, and story development differed
in many respects in the two works. Dialogue differed greatly.
The court found no infringement.
News and Other Commercial Uses. In moving from the per-
sonal or private use cases to the parody and burlesque area, it can
be seen that as we approach the latter end of the spectrum,
appropriation will generally be more restricted. This is because
in the courts' eyes, commercial and competitive factors are more
prevalent here.
In a, case in which a book giving the history of popular music
in the United States contained the words and melody line of a
copyrighted song, it was held that the book provided a sub-
stitute for the song, even though the song was no longer popular,
and, therefore, the use was not fair.183 An easier case, denying
the defense of fair use, involved the copying of a chorus of a
copyrighted song belonging to a rival and competing publishing
company.1
84
Although news itself is not the subject of copyright,18 5 the
rights in an interpretive newspaper article concerning the hopes
of Germany during the First World War was infringed by an
181. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
182. Id. See text accompanying note 177 supra. See also Sehvin, Parody and
Burlesque of Copyright Works as Infringement, 6 BuLL. Copy. Soc. 53 (1958).
183. Sayers v. Spaeth, Copy. OF. Bum.L (No. 20,625) (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
184. Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d
282 (8th Cir. 1939).
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article which expounded the same ideas and used the same
literary style
18 6
In Associated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Debs Memorial Radio
Fund, Inc.,8 7 the defendants, owners of a nonprofit radio sta-
tion devoted to educational and cultural purposes, claimed that
the broadcasting of plaintiff's copyrighted musical composition
was for the ultimate purpose of raising funds for a charitable
organization set up in honor of a late labor leader. The court
held that the lofty aims of the corporation did not prevent the
broadcast from constituting a "public performance for profit."' 88
It was found that the money for the fund was to come in part
from the radio station's profits and that the broadcast was for
the purpose of building up a listening audience so that profits
might be realized.' 89
It has been suggested that this case "may demonstrate the
difficulty in establishing the absence of any commercial mo-
tive."' 00 At the same time "a finding of fair use will not be
compelled by the fact that the defendant seeks no profit from
the operation."'19
III. AN ANALYsIS By Tm FAno UsE APPROACH
What constitutes fair use is an issue of fact,19 2 but what facts
will be sufficient to raise this defense in any given case is not
easily answered because the doctrine is a vague concept and
its limits are not clear. It is important that one be able to
186. Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n., 275 F. 297 (7th Cir.
1921). In New York Tribune, Inc. v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y.
1941). The defendant's intent and the effect of his publication on plaintiff's work
where he had photo-stated an entire editorial were examined to determine
fair use. Relief for unfair competition arising out of the appropriation of news
was recognized in the leading case of I.N.S. v. A.P., 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
187. 46 F. Supp. 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), affd 141 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1944).
188. Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1952).
189. In affirming the district court decision the court of appeals suggested
that
[t]here can be no doubt that the portion of the plaintiff's composition
which was broadcast which amounted to about a quarter of his entire
work and was reproduced to aid in building up a listening audience does
not come within the definition of "fair use".
141 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1944). See also Comment, Copyrights and T.V.-A
New Use for the Multiple Performance Theory, 18 U. Cm. L. REV. 757
(1951).
190. Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Study No. 14 in COPYRIGHT
LAw REVISIoN: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JDIcIARY, 86 Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1958).
191. Id.
192. Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Pub., Inc., 246 F2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957).
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predict from a consideration of all the evidence when the doc-
trine of fair use will be involved. Judge Yankwich put it this
way:
If the amount reproduced is legitimately necessary to re-
view the book, or is a part of a scientific or other exposition
of the subject, in which the theories expounded by others
must be discussed, the use, regardless of quantity, is fair.
If, on the other hand, the appropriation of the copyrighted
product of another is motivated by the desire to derive
commercial benefit, the use, regardless of quantity, is un-
fair.9 s
The rule may be no more precise than the application of the
Golden Rule to the fact situation: "Take not from others to
such an extent and in such a manner that you would be re-
sentful if they so took from you.5 194
Since the doctrine is an equitable one which goes beyond the
rights and wishes of the copyright proprietor and includes a
consideration of the public interest, one must look for a me-
chanical rule to guide the courts in differentiating between
infringement and fair use and in establishing the boundary line
between the two. The difference ultimately resolves itself into
the application of broad and indefinite principles or criteria to
the particular circumstances encountered in each case. A test
often quoted is that of Mr. Justice Story in Folsom v. Marsh:
We must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity
and value of the materials used, and the degree in which
the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects of the original work. Many mixed
ingredients enter into the discussion of such questions. In
some cases, a considerable portion of the material of the
original work may be fused ... into another work, so as
to be undistinguishable in the mass of the latter, which
has other professed and obvious objects, and cannot be
fairly treated as a piracy; or they may be inserted as a
sort of distinct and mosaic work, into the general texture
193. Yankwich, What is Fair Use, 22 U. C3i. L. REv. 201, 208-09 (1954).
194. McDonald, Non-Infringing Uses, 9 Buu-. Copy. Soc. 466, 467 (1962).
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of the second work, and constitute the peculiar excellence
thereof, and then it may be a clear piracy.195
The cases indicate that there are nine elements which bear
on the determination: (1) the nature of plaintiff's material and
his intention, (2) the type and purpose of the use involved, (3)
the quantative extent of material used, (4) the qualitative extent
of material used, (5) the intent with which the material was
used, (6) the effect on the original material, (7) the amount of
the user's labor involved, (8) the benefit to the user, and (9) the
manner by which the copying was accomplished.
The Nature of Plaintiff's MateriaZ and His Intention. The
privilege of fair use is very much related to the nature of
plaintiff's material and his intention. For example, fair use
of materials is given the widest berth in the areas of science
and the arts where it is necessary for subsequent authors to
work from earlier writing. The doctrine is very restricted in
areas of competing publications treating the same subject, broad-
ening out again if the two works are dissimilar in scope, con-
tent and purpose.19 6
The privilege will be greater in scholarly works than in com-
mercial publications. 97 In Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett &
Meyers Tobacco Co.,198 the commercial element was decisive,
although the works were completely dissimilar and not com-
petitive. In this case a doctor had written a book entitled The
Human Voice, Its Care and Development, which was copy-
righted by the plaintiff. The defendant put out a booklet on
cigarettes and quoted three lines of the doctor's book to the
effect that tobacco, when properly used, has no deleterious ef-
195. 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Another test fre-
quently paraphrased is that of Judge Clifford, in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas.
26, 61 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
Examined as a question of strict law, apart from exceptional cases, the
privilege of fair use accorded to a subsequent writer must be such, and
such only, as will not cause substantial injury to the proprietor of the first
publication; but cases frequently arise in which, though there is some
injury yet equity will not interpose by injunction to prohibit further use,
as where the amount copied is small and of little value, if there is no
proof of bad motive, or where there is a well-founded doubt as to the
legal title ....
196. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY ProPERTY 261 (1944).
197. See text beginning at note 96 supra. It may be wise to reconsider the
distinctions made in W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co. 27 F.2d
82, 89 (6th Cir. 1928) and Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140
F. 539 (1st Cir. 1905).
198. 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
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feet. The court refused to apply the doctrine of fair use, holding
that there was an appropriation by the cigarette company of
the conclusions and labors of the doctor which constituted an
infringement of his copyrighted work.
If the presumed intention of the writer is to allow certain
uses of his work or to provide a model for copying, he should
not be allowed to object to its being used for the purpose for
which it was produced.19 9 This factor of intent should be con-
sidered in tandem with the nature of the author's work.
The Type and Purpose of the Use Invovled. The type of use
involved is a decisive factor. The courts have uniformly recog-
nized that a copyrighted work may be subject to fair use in
criticism and review200 and that it may also be commented on
and quoted without permission insofar as may be necessary to
make the comment coherent.20 1 The problem can be appreciated
by considering this statement:
Reviewers may make extracts sufficient to show the merits
or demerits of the original work, but they cannot so exercise
the privilege as to supersede the original book. .. . The
privilege of making extracts is limited to those objects,
and cannot be exercised to such an extent that the review
shall become a substitute for the work reviewed.202
Courts are inclined to some greater degree of liberality toward
the user in cases involving works designed and intended for
some reproductive use by others, such as dictionaries, digests,
statistical compilations and the like.203 They do so from the
feeling that the nature or character of the work is somewhat
of an invitation to others to use it in the way and for the
purpose that it was designed and published.204 However, when
199. 2 LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
MATERIAL 805 (1938). See Ager v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigational
Co., [1884] 26 ch. 637 (handwriting copybook); American Institute of Archi-
tects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (form book). Contra,
Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304
(E.D. Pa. 1938).
200. See text beginning at note 118 supra.
201. See Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGnT LAW
SymPosium 43 (1955).
202. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1809).
203. See West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson & Co., 169 F. 833 (C.C.E.D.-
N.Y. 1910), modified 176 F. 833 (2d Cir. 1910); Webb v. Powers, 29 F. Cas.
511 (No. 17,323) (1847).
204. Cf. Baker v Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-93 (1879); Karll v. Curtis Pub.
Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837-38 (E.D. Wis. 1941); Towle v. Ross, 32 F. Supp.
125, 127, n. 21 (D.C. Ore. 1940) ; Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford
Co., 140 F. 539, 541-42 (1st Cir. 1905).
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the court enunciates the criteria or tests they profess to be
guided by, they list the same tests which they resort to in the
ran of the mill case of literary or dramatic plagiarism.
20 5
The Quantitative Extent of Materiel Used. The quantitative
extent of material used is relevant in determining whether there
has been an infringement and in determining whether there
has been a fair use made of the copyrighted material. When
quantity is used as a factor in determining whether there has
been a fair use, it is not as important a consideration as other
factors such as the qualitative content of the portion taken.
Wholesale copying, however, without the presence of other
factors has been used as a single standard:
Counsel have not disclosed a single authority, nor have we
been able to find one, which lends any support to the propo-
sition that wholesale copying and publication of copyrighted
material can ever be fair use.
20 6
According to another court: "One cannot copy the substance
of another's work without infringing his copyright.
207
In Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobaeco Co.,208
although only three sentences were extracted from the copy-
righted work, they comprised five per cent of the user's work.
Unless other factors make the use privileged, it seems the user
is getting something valuable for nothing.209
The Qualitative Extent of Material Used. In Shapiro, Bern-
stein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co.,210 the court stated that
the criteria for determining fair use included the "relative value
of the extract."211 Qualitative extent or value must depend not
only on the relative sizes of the two works,21 2 but also on the
significance of the material as representing the heart or crux
of the original. In another case magazine covers were repro-
205. See, e.g., Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F2d 73,
84-85 (6th Cir. 1943).
206. Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937).
207. Loew's, Inc. v. Benny, 239 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd inem. by
an equally divided Court sub rom. C.B.S. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
208. 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
209. But see Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
210. 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
211. Id. at 43.
212. This qualification factor ties in with the quantitative. This point was
made clear in the case of Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
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duced for use in circulars describing the defendant's modelling
school. Here the court noted: "Its very essence--the picture
of the model-was [used], as was also the title. 2 13 Where part
of the author's Russian language chart was incorporated into
another's book on Russian, it was held material that the chart
contained a unique method of teaching the pronunciation of the
Russian alphabet.214
The Intent with whiok the Material Was Used. The state
of mind of the user, ordinarily immaterial to the determination
of infringement, 215 is relevant to the question of fair use. 216 It
was stated in the early case of Lawrenee v. Dana 17 that evi-
dence of innocent intention may have a bearing upon the
question of fair use. It has been suggested that the innocent
intention in this context may be synonymous with "good
faith. 218
There are many cases which manifest the importance of in-
nocent intention. In order for parody or burlesque to be a fair
use, it must be in good faith; that is, the imitation must not
be for the purpose of evading the owner's copyright by pre-
senting the song or other work under the disguise of parody or
burlesque.2 1 9 In New York Tqibune, Inc. v. Otis & Co.,220 the
possible intent of the defendant to use the plaintiff's editorial
in a non-commercial manner was recognized by the court as
a significant issue of fact requiring denial of a motion for
summary judgment. It is important to note that if a court holds
that the use involved was fair, although it may say that intent
is not an element, it will usually observe that there was no
intent to infringe. Therefore, intent to infringe is not essential
213. Conde Nast Publications v. Vogue School of Fashion Modelling, Inc.,
105 F. Supp. 325, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
214. Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, 144 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
aff'd, 246 F. 501 (2d Cir. 1957). See also BAIL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND
LITERARY PioPERTY 335 (1944); 2 LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTiSTIC PROPERTY 811 (1938).
215. Buck v. Jewell-Lasalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
216. See Peck, Copyright-Infringement of Literary Works, 38 MARQ. L.
RPv. 180, 187 (1955).
217. 15 F. Cas. 26 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
218. Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 COPYRIGHT LAW
SYmposium 43, 60 (1955).
219. See text following note 163 supra.
220. 39 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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to the wrong,2 21 but it is a factor to be considered, especially
if equitable relief is sought. 
22 2
The Effect on the Originad Materiad. The courts have given
great weight to the effect of the appropriated work on the
original material. The test, for example, as applied to a copy-
righted work which is subject to fair use in the way of review
and commentary 223 is whether the subsequent piece "will ma-
terially reduce the demand for the original," 224 not by reason
of adverse criticism but because the publication so fully discloses
the contents of the book. I suggest that this test shades into
the question of qualitative extent.
225
The same issue is present in the parody and burlesque field.
2 20
In short, a parody or burlesque of a literary work, which
textually reproduces a few lines in a burlesque setting is a fair
use, provided that it does not prejudice the sale, diminish the
profits or supersede the objects of the original work.
227
The absence of music may preclude impairment of the value
of a copyrighted musical composition. Thus, where portions of
the lyrics were used as background for the action in a short
story,228 or in connection with a magazine article about the
professional football team for whom the song was written,
22D
no liability for infringement was incurred. A contrary result
was reached, however, where all the lyrics as well as the melody
line of a copyrighted song were included in a narrative history
of popular songs in the United States. 230 How perfect a sub-
stitute is the appropriation? The nearness may be material
in determining fair use.
221. See 2 LADAs, THE INTERNATIONAL PoroECox OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC PROPERTY 816 (1938); Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 554,
555 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). See also Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F2d 664 (7th
Cir. 1950); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q.
40; Copy. OFF. BUL.. (No. 20,656) 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
222. See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D. Mass.
1869). See also New York Tribune v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67, 68
(S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also COPYRIGHT LAw 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1964) (dam-
ages).
223. See text following note 125 supra.
224. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
225. See text following note 210 supra.
226. See text following note 163 supra.
227. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Song Parodies, Inc., 146 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1944);
Bloom v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903).
228. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1941).
229. KarlU v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
230. Sayers v. Spaeth, Copy. OFF. BuLL. (No. 20) 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
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The defendants in Folsom v. Marslh281 had copied a substantial
portion of the plaintiff's multi-volume work and Mr. Justice
Story held them liable for violating the copyright.28 2  Here
the issues of quantity and quality tended to overlap. In sum,
there can be no fair use if there is or likely will be substantial
injury to the copyright owner by virtue of the use.
The Amount of the User's Labor Inv.oZved. Courts have a
natural tendency to find against one -who copies another's
material verbatim. If this practice is found, the fact that
there is an absence of injury to the copyright owner will not
preclude a finding of infringement.
This factor is particularly significant when originality is
lacking in the facts or materials of the copied version, and the
facts or materials copied are open to all.288 Thus, the compiler
of an atlas or city directory may use earlier works on the sub-
ject if he adds his own revision and correction so as to produce
his own original result and if he does not deny the use made




The Benefit to the User. The scope of the privilege of fair
use is determined at least partially by the benefit derived by
the user.235 Generally this benefit will manifest itself in the
amount of the user's labor involved.238 Ball says that "no one is
entitled to save time, trouble and expense by availing himself of
another's copyrighted work for the sake of making an unearned
profit .... 1237
The Manner by which the Copying "Was Accomplished. It is
obvious that a critical element is the manner of appropriation.
The potential for harm to the copyright holder is slight when
231. 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
232. See Mr. Justice Story's often-quoted test at note 195 supra.
233. Farmer v. Calvert Lithographing Co., 8 F. Cas. 1022 (No. 4,651)
(C.C.E.D. Mich. 1872) (map). See also Markham v. A. E. Borden Co. 206
F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1953) (catalogues); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee
Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943) (photograph); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937) (telephone book); Jewelers' Circular Pub.
Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S.
581 (1921) (trade mark directory); Ager v. Peninsular & Oriental Steam
Navigation Co., 26 Ch.D. 637 (1884) (telegraphic code).
234. See Wh9ite v. Bender, 185 F. 921 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1911).
235. See, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Pub. Co., 181 F2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950);
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
236. See text following note 233 supra.
237. BALL, THE LAW oF COPYRIGHT AwD LrmmAy PRonRTa 261 (1944).
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the culprit is a pen, but when the copier resorts to a high speed
photoduplicating machine the injury is imminent and beyond
repair.
IV. APP RoAcHEs To PoTEc oN
There is a problem caused by the ever increasing need for
rapid and efficient dissemination of literary works. Copying
has become a simple technique and copying machines have be-
come common and familiar everywhere. Copies may be used
for scholarly purposes as well as infringement. As the cost of
copying continues to drop and new and better techniques are
developed, a dilemma is posed: how to meet the user's needs
for information and at the same time protect the copyright
owner's property rights.
It is not easy to consider, measure and evaluate the various
alternatives from the viewpoint of the interest groups involved
when it is remembered that the producer (copyright owner) is
also a consumer. But two points are clear. First, literary works
are the property of the copyright owner. Second, the owners
usually want this material copied-for a price.
Before considering possible courses of action it is important
to list a number of basic values that should be included in any
acceptable plan.28 8  (1) The approach should allow a copy or
copies to be made without first securing permission from the
copyright owner, (2) the approach should furnish a reasonable
compensation to the copyright owner to recognize both the lost
sale and the property right, (3) the approach should treat all
literary work uniformly, (4) the approach should be practical to
administer, and (5) the approach should provide for mandatory
participation of copyright owners and users.
We are now in a position to evaluate the various approaches.
A. Legislative Alternatives.
Statutory Silence. One possible solution is legislative inaction.
This would require the courts to solve the problems associated
with wide-spread copying devices. The issue of fair use is
particularly susceptible to this case-by-case solution. I am
not convinced for reasons that will be made clear in the next
238. A set of necessary and desirable specifications for nonprofit scientific
or educational copying purposes has been outlined in First Annual Report of
the Committee to Investigate Copyright Problems Affecting Communication
in Science and Education, 10 BULL. CoPY. Soc. 1 (1962).
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section that any legislative approach can or should be expected
to answer issues of relative value, user's intent, competitive
effect and the like. The interest groups are quite prepared to
leave these questions to the courts; their faith is good enough
for me.
The music industry faced a similar, although not completely
analogous, situation early in the 1900's. Faced with legislative
inaction the American Society of Authors, Composers and Pub-
lishers has operated a clearing house successfully for over fifty
years.2
80
I suggest that those who find fault with a legislature who
would not face up to answering this problem may be missing
the point entirely.2 0  Our capitalistic system of free enterpri~e
sagely leaves such economic matters to private decision in the
marketplace. When the time is right and the needed number of
dollar ballots have been counted, a freer bargain will be struck
between buyer (user) and seller (copyright owner) than could
emerge from the emotion charged political chambers of gov-
ernment.
This approach would be based on the premise that the failure
to mention fair use in the first of the modern copyright re-
visions 41 in 1909 was intentional and wise. A Senate com-
mittee reported: "Questions ... of what is a 'fair use' of copy-
righted matter, and what is an 'infringement' it leaves still to
the courts."242 The best case for statutory silence might be
stated as follows:
Arguably, the question of fair use, as merely one dimension
of the problem of infringement, is as peculiarly susceptible
to case-by-case solution as infringement itself. . . . No
239. The organization and operation of ASCAP is detailed by Professors
Kaplan and Brown, who have made a career studying the protection of liter-
ary, musical and artistic works. KAPLAN & BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT
428 (1960). See also, Finkelstein, Public Performance Rights in Music and
Performance Rights Societies, in SEWN COPYRIGHT PROBLERIS ANALYZED 69
(1952).1
240. First Annual Report of the Committee to Investigate Copyright Prob-
lems Affecting Communication in Science and Education, 10 Buu.. Copy.
Soc. 1 (1962).
241. Our first copyright law was enacted in 1790. General revisions have
occurred in 1831, 1870 and 1909. The last statutes were compiled into 64 sec-
tions. Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1964).
242. S. REP. No. 6187, 59th Cong., 2d Sess. (1907). The Librarian of
Congress stated that fair use is not treated in the bill but left "to the courts
to determine the meaning and extent." Hearings on S. 6330 & H.R. 19853
Before the Committee on Patents, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1906).
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statute can effectively cover questions of quantity, shadings
of purposes and competitive effect and the like. To select
narrow areas for solution might be inequitable unless there
are special problems of practical significance to be re-
solved.2
48
Statutory Fair Use. There are at least four possibilities for
treatment of the problem of fair use through legislation: (1) to
recognize the doctrine of fair use without further elaboration
or definition, (2) to recognize expressly the doctrine of fair
use for certain purposes or specific situations, (3) to recognize
expressly the doctrine of fair use by specifying, criteria for
determining whether a particular use is permissible, and (4) to
recognize expressly the doctrine of fair use for certain purposes
as long as specific conditions are met.
(1) Recognition of the Doctrine of Fair Use Without More.
The 1965 Revision Bill simply stated that "the fair use of a
copyrighted work is not an infringement of copyright."244 This
approach was adopted because "it appeared impossible to reach
agreement on a general statement expressing the scope of the
fair use doctrine, and since in any event the doctrine emerges
from a body of judicial precedent and not from the statute."24"
The House Committee on the Judiciary believed that even this
approach was meaningful and in the best interest.
The sharp dialogue at the hearings between the authors and
the publishers and that between educators and scholars did not
hide their unselfish appreciation of mutual goals and of the
need for reasonable accommodation. The provision would main-
tain a degree of flexibility that would be lost if Congress at-
tempted to define the doctrine. The needs of the interest groups
could best be worked out voluntarily or left to litigation.
An interesting similar approach to the problem of fair use
would have engrafted an exception to the general copyright
grant of section 4 that "nothing in this Act shall prevent the
fair use of quotations from copyrighted matter."246 Under the
243. Latman, Fair Use of Copyright Works, Study No. 14 it COPYRIGHT
LAw REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDIcIARY, 86 Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1958).
244. H.R. 4347 & S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
245. COPYRIGHT LAW Rms ON, PART 6 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL LVISION OF TE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAw: 1965 REViSION BIum 28 (1965).
246. H.R. 139 and S. 176, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931).
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provision fair use would be permissible only in the absence of
an express prohibition by the copyright owner.
(2) Recognition of the Doctrine of Fair Use for Certain Oc-
casions. A bill introduced to the sixty-eighth Congress in 1924
proposed immunity for fair use covering four broad cate-
gories:247 (1) educational uses, including study and research,
(2) special uses of a public nature, including criticisms or re-
views and newspaper articles, (3) public performances of a
published work, and (4) reproduction of artistic works. Had
the Bill become law I suggest it would have created more
problems than it resolved. No definition of fair use was of-
fered. This is not only excusable, it is preferable. But, a num-
ber of vague and amorphous phrases such as "short passages,"2 48
"reasonable extract,"2 49 and "main design or scope"2 0 were
used. Judicial interpretation of this fair use provision would
probably have caused a radical departure from the then exist-
ing case law on the subject.
Similarly, a Senate bill exempted from liability performance
of a copyrighted musical work when used for charitable, re-
ligious or educational activities in addition to the "merely in-
cidental and not reasonably avoidable"251 use of copyrighted
material in a motion picture or broadcast dealing with current
news events. Another bill in the House of Representatives gave
an exemption to a news photograph "as an item of public or
general interest."
2 52
In the hearings on these bills the interest groups split in ex-
pected fashion. ASCAP cried foul:
There is no reason why exhibitors and distributors of news-
reels should be permitted to make profit from the use of
copyrighted material without payment.
There is nothing to prevent an unscrupulous broadcaster
from broadcasting an entire show as a current event. This
could be done by merely coupling the performance with a
broadcast of current news events.25
3
247. H.R. 8177, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. § 27 (1924). The British Copyright
Act of 1911 served as the model. 1 and 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 § 2 (1911).
248. H.R. 8177, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. § 27(4) (1924).
249. Id. at § 27 (5).
250. Id. at § 27 (2).
251. S. 3047, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 17(g) (4) (1935).
252. H.R. 11420, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. § 26 (1936).




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss2/1
18E RI S AND FALL or FAr UsE
Of course the National Association of Broadcasters favored
the bills, claiming that only a technical violation of the copy-
right with minimal damage at most was allowed. On what
were termed "important considerations of public policy,'"2 "
the broadcasters called for the unrestricted continuation of "one
of radio's greatest contributions to civilization.",2r
The movie producers, not surprisingly, found themselves sid-
ing with their perennial competitors, the radio broadcasters.
They characterized this provision as a token gesture and urged
the adoption of a proposal that would cover all copyrighted
material where the infringement was "incidental and not really
avoidable." 258
The most complete and renowned study of copyright revision
was carried out by the Shotwell Committee from 1938 to
1941.257 The Shotwell provisions introduced by Senator Thomas
took four different approaches to the issue of fair use and cov-
ered a number of controversial situations: (1) The bill gave
permission for translation incident to private study and research
as well as for reproductions of single copies by libraries of un-
published or unavailable works needed for study or research.258
(2) The bill gave permission to radio and television broadcasters
to record their programs for private file and reference pur-
poses.25 9 (3) The bill gave permission for incidental infringe-
ment either in the course of simultaneous news reporting from
the location in question or in a photograph, motion picture or
television broadcast of a work of art on public exhibition. 260
(4) The bill gave permission for public performance of musi-
cal compositions by charitable, religious or educational groups
and representations of architectural works as long as they were
not in the nature of models, designs or plans.
261
254. Id. at 478.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1020.
257. The entire history of the committee and its efforts are contained in
SHOTWELL PAPERS (1939-1941).
258. S. 3043, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. § 12(f), (g) & (h) (1940).
259. Id. at § 12(e).
260. Id. at § 12(b) & (d).
261. Id. at § 12(a) & (c).
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These elaborate and varied provisions concerning fair use were
the subject of considerable discussion, analysis and contro-
versy.
20 2
(3) Recognition and Definition of the Doct7ine of Fair Use.
The boldest attempts to cope with legislative recognition of fair
use specified relevant factors or general criteria present in the
common law as an aid to defining fair use or provided for
controlling effect factors, for example, by specifying the per-
missible amounts of material that may be reproduced.
As shown above the courts have evolved a set of criteria to
balance the equities when no statute exists. These criteria were
reduced to four standards in the 1963 draft revision bill:263
(1) purpose and character of the use, (2) nature of the copy-
righted work, (3) amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and (4) effect
of the use upon the potential value of the copyrighted work.
This legislative approach would present the practical diffi-
culties faced by any attempt to codify the common law. A
further problem is simply that subtle factual interactions vary
from case to case. A court is best able to balance and apply
the recognized criteria under a factual rather than statutory
context. What may be more troublesome is that it would not
be uncommon for gaps to be left by the statute.
Congress has within its power to enlarge as well as restrict
the judicially constructed doctrine of fair use. This could be
accomplished by specifying the relevant criteria. However, be-
fore Congress takes such a giant step they must be aware of
the barrel of snakes such legislation unhappily poses.
The 1963 bill would have permitted libraries to supply a
single photocopy of a portion of a copyrighted work or a
single photocopy of an entire copyrighted work if it were out
of print. This provision was finally dropped in the face of
adverse comment. The authors and publishers argued that the
law would permit uses that were currently considered illegal:
The wholesale and unrestrained copying by libraries could re-
262. The subjects ranged from the special problems of the scholar to the
appropriate limitations on performing rights. The pressure groups were well
represented but they made for more discord than harmony. See Sargoy, Com-
parison of the Drafted Proposals of the Various Interested Groups in 1 SHoT-
wELL PAPERs 241 (1938-1939).
263. See COPYRIGHT LAW RmEVISIO, PART 6 SUPPLEmENTARY REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPY-
RIGHT IAW, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1965).
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place publishers' editions and undercut their sales and reve-
nues. 264 The library groups maintained that the provision would
prevent practices that were then thought to be legal: The
established services would be curtailed and the ability to use
new devices in the interests of research and scholarship would
be prevented.265
Although earlier attempts had used such phrases as "short
passages"2 66 and "reasonable extracts,"267 either model contained
its built-in defects. The 1963 approach was rigid and unyielding
under any situation while the earlier draft offered no clue
as to whether they were codifying the common law or framing a
new, vague standard to be left for judicial interpretation.
(4) Recognition of the Doctrine of Fair Use Under Certain
Conditions. Congress might attempt to cover specific fair uses
with recognition given to generally accepted criteria or condi-
tions. The 1964 bill 268 included substantially the same criteria
seen in the 1963 version but focused its attention on purposes
"such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholar-
ship, or research." 269 Thus, the 1964 bill shades over into the
fourth category because the recognized uses and criteria come
into play only "to the extent reasonably necessary or incidental
to a legitimate purpose."2 70
In like fashion, several bills have recognized fair use only
after fulfilling the condition precedent of acknowledgment.
Thus, House bills 27 ' in the seventy-second Congress provided:
None of the remedies given to the copyright owner by
this Act shall be deemed to apply to . . . the fair use of
quotations from copyright matter provided credit is given
to the copyright owner.27
2
264. COPYRIGHT LAW RmEVISION, PART 6 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAw: 1965 REVIsION BIU. 26 (1965).
265. Id.
266. H.R. 8177, § 27, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
267. Id.
268. H.R. 11947 & S. 3008, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1964).
269. Id. at § 6.
270. Id.
271. H.R. 10364 & H.R. 10740, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
272. Id. at § 11. A subsequent measure introduced the addition of the words
"or the work quoted to" to the end of the subsection. H.R. 10976, § 11, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1932). The policy behind these bills was to fill the doctrinal
gap left where use was not strictly forbidden. In truth the issues of acknowl-
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There are three categories of fair use decisional law. The
first covers the recognized purposes of criticism, review and
scholarship.273 The second includes news reporting, teaching
and like practices.274 In the third category are those uses courts
cannot agree upon such as parody and burlesque, and personal
use.278 The first two categories were partially recognized by
the 1964 bill. Yet the hard cases, those in the third category,
perhaps most deserving of Congressional enlightenment, were
ignored.
Statutory Licensing. Compulsory statutory licensing is recog-
nized in the present law.2 7 6 It is provided that when the copy-
right owner of a musical work has once permitted its use in
a phonorecord, anyone else may use the work in another phono-
record upon notifying the copyright owner and paying a speci-
fied royalty. This principle could be extended to copyrighted
literary works.
The compulsory licensing provisions were introduced in the
Copyright Law as a compromise in 1909 in an attempt to balance
rival philosophies. 277 The one side, fearing monopoly, favored
nonrecognition of recording and mechanical reproduction
rights,278 while the other side, stressing the rights of artists
edged credit or express prohibition represent rival philosophies, for by suffer-
ing one the other is diluted. Since this goes to the very heart of the copyright
rationale, it is worth nothing that the shooting still goes on. See H.R. 139,
§ 4 & S. 176 § 4, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931); H.R. 8177, § 27, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1924).
273. See text following notes 99 & 125 supra.
274. See text following notes 182 supra.
275. See text following notes 157 & 163 supra.
276. Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(3), & 101(e) (1965).
277. Except for the relocation of the semicolon in section 1(e) in 1947 to
separate the provision relating to "public performance for profit" rights from
the judicially construed provisions relating to recording and mechanical
reproduction rights and the change of numbering section 25(e) to 101(e) the
provisions have remained intact since 1909. See Act of July 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
652; Hubbell v. Royal Pastime Amusement Co., 242 F. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
For a clause-by-clause analysis of the compulsory license provisions see
Evans, Law of Copyright and the Right of Mechanical Reproduction of Musical
Compositions, COPYRIGHT LAw Sy posiumi 113, 118-31 (1940). The pre-
1909 controversy is documented by Henn, The Compulsory License Provisions
of the U.S. Copyright Law, Study No. 5 in COPYRIGHT LAW REvsIow:
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th
Cong. 1st Sess. 2-12 (1956).
278. A potential monopoly on mechanical music through the use of exclusive
contracts was regarded as a serious threat at a time when effective antitrust
regulation was still in its infancy. See H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7-8 (1909). Hearings on H.R. 19853 & S. 6330, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
23-26, 94-97, 139-48, 166, 185-98, 202-06 (1909).
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and freedom of contract, urged absolute recognition.27 9 The
end result was qualified recognition based upon the compulsory
license principle.
For almost 60 years the American record industry has relied
on the compulsory license principle. This has had a profound
effect upon the music business and many of the present practices
in the industry are directly related to the provision. Specifically,
the provision places four limitations on the copyright owner's
freedom to contract: (1) the persons with whom he may refuse
to contract, (2) the times when he may contract, (3) the price
at which he may contract, and (4) the time period during which
the copyrighted property may be used. Just as soon as one re-
cording has been agreed to, anyone is free to record the same
composition without time limit so long as he makes the required
royalty payments.
It should be borne in mind that exercise of the compulsory
license is entirely optional with the record maker, being com-
pulsory only on the copyright owner. The alternative of bar-
gaining with the copyright owner for a negotiated license is
always open to the record maker. Consequently, the statutory
royalty rate operates as a ceiling: The record producer can
bargain for a lower rate, but the copyright owner can never
bargain for a higher one. The vast majority of recording li-
censes in the United States have been negotiated, and at various
times in the past, record manufacturers have obtained negotiated
licenses at less than the existing statutory rate.
Should the principle of the compulsory license for mechanical
recording of music be transferred over to the field of literary
works? The major issues of such an approach include the fol-
lowing: (1) the specified event, such as publication or permis-
sion given to anyone to copy, that will make the compulsory
license available, (2) the nature of the original literature that
will or will not make the copyrighted work available to others
for copying under a compulsory license, (3) the nature of the
copies that can or cannot be made under a compulsory license,
(4) the limitations on the right of copying incidental to using
under a compulsory license, (5) the requisite notice to be given
to the copyright owner of the user's intention to exercise the
compulsory license, (6) the liability and/or termination of the
compulsory license to the copyright owner if a user fails to give
279. See 37 Music TRADES, March 13, 1909, at 6.
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the required notice, (7) the identification of the copyright own-
er in the registration or other public records of the Copyright
Office, (8) the effect of the copyright owner's failure to file
identification in a suit for infringement of copyright, (9) the
basis of the royalty either on the number of copies made or on
the number of distributed, (10) the rate of the royalty which
may be a flat sum per copy, a flat sum per page or per unit of
material, a percentage of the retail sales price or a percentage
of the manufacturer's price, (11) the amount of the royalty to
be paid whether a flat sum or percentage figure, (12) the ac-
counting and payment practices of users of the compulsory
license to safeguard the copyright owner, (13) the mechanism
for collecting the royalties and distributing them, and (14) the
application of the royalty rate to literary works manufactured
in the United States, to literary works sold in the United States
or some other basis.
There may be several possible variations on each of these
major aspects of a compulsory license provision for literary
material. For example, the freedom to copy might become
effective only after a certain time period, or the statutory royalty
might be varied in numerous ways. Moreover, the compulsory
concept itself might be limited to a fixed period after a speci-
fied event such as the permission given to anyone to copy. In
addition, a tribunal might be established to determine a fair
or reasonable royalty. Still other variations might be applied,
such as a sliding scale of royalties increasing as the number of
sales of the work increased.
Each of the points would present a lively issue. The law
would permit copying, thus, instilling a degree of certainty.
Copyright owners would receive a fee for their labors. And
users of copyrighted material would not be free to appropriate
-trespass on-what should be regarded as the most private of
all property rights.
Paradoxically, this arrangement would reduce the owner's
property rights at the same time, for he would not be able to
choose who may copy. Yet, since the practice is so widespread
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B. Private Ordering Alternatives.
Voluntary Agreement Among Users and Copyright Holders.
The Gentlemen's Agreement 28 0 entered into between the Joint
Committee on Materials for Research of the American Council
of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, and
the National Association of Book Publishers in May 1935 was
the first uniform policy concerning copying by libraries.
In substance the agreement provided 2
l that libraries and
similar institutions might make single copies of a "part" of a
book or periodical to be furnished "without profit" to a scholar
who represented in writing that the copy was in place of a
loan or in lieu of a hand copy and was solely for purposes of
research. The agreement not only purported to exempt from
liability the library reproducing the copy, but also its agents.
The scholar receiving the copy was warned of his liability to
the copyright owner should he misuse the copy.
The agreement recognized the exclusive right of the copyright
owner to make copies of his work notwithstanding the doctrine
of fair use. No working definition of fair use was contained
in the agreement. However, the portions quoted below are of
interest:
While the right of quotation without permission is not pro-
vided in law, the courts have recognized the right to a
"fair use" of book quotations, the length of a "fair" quo-
tation being dependent upon the type of work quoted from
and the "fairness" to the author's interest. Extensive quo-
tation is obviously inimical to the author's interest.
The statutes make no specific provision for the right of a
research worker to make copies by hand or by typescript
for his research notes, but a student has always been free
to "copy" by hand; and mechanical reproductions from
280. The complete text of this agreement was published in 2 JoURNAL. O
DOCUMENTARY REPRODUCTION 31 (1939) ; the principal portion of it reappeared
in 46 LAw LB. J. 10 (1953).
281. The agreement is no longer of legal effect.
One of the parties to the so-called agreement, the National Association
of Book Publishers, has since ceased to exist. The book publishers are
now organized in the American Book Publishers Council. Furthermore,
the periodical publishers, who publish most of the scientific and technical
material of interest to researchers, were not generally members of that
Association, and even many book publishers were not members.
Varmer, Photoduplication of Copyrighted Materials by Libraries, Study No. 15
in COPYRIGE T LAw R sisox: STUDIES PREPAM FOR THE SENATE SUtCo0L-
MITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, 51 n. 9 (1959).
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copyrighted material are presumably intended to take the
place of hand transcriptions, and to be governed by the same
principles governing hand transcription.
28 2
A letter from Robert C. Binkley, Chairman, Joint Committee
on Materials for Research, follows in part:
The agreement was not made as a contract conferring rights
and imposing obligations on the parties, but was rather a
statement of the practical scope of the established doctrine
of fair use as applied to the making of photostat or other
copies by libraries for scholars. The practice is old, has
been recognized as reasonable and has never led to any
litigation. The Courts have, in other cases, long recognized
that copyrights are subject to fair use.283
The Gentlemen's Agreement was only the first step in placing
the reproduction of copyrighted materials on a firm legal
basis. Disclaimers from liability came into practice.
28 4
A statement of policy with regard to the reproduction of
library materials was prepared by Keyes D. Metcalf, Executive
Secretary of the Association of Research Libraries, at the request
of the Association and adopted by the Council of the American
Library Association, at its midwinter meeting in December 1940.
This became known as the Reproduction of Materials Code.
28 15
The Gentlemen's Agreement was limted to "books and peri-
odical volumes." The Code, however, covered three categories of
282. Materials cited in note 280 supra.
283. 2 JOURNAL OF DOCUMENTARY REPRODUCTION 35 (1939).
284. Below is a typical disclaimer drawn by legal counsel:
I represent that this order for a photocopy of each of the materials
listed above is in lieu of any loan or manual for my private use for re-
search purposes, I understand that I cannot legally sell or further repro-
duce the copy supplied without the express permission of the copyright
proprietor if publication is covered by copyright. I assume responsibility
for copyright infringement arising out of this order or the use of mate-
rials requested and I will hold the [copying institution] harmless from
any misuse of such material.
Note that the disclaimer attempts to do four things:
(1) The reader states that it is in lieu of a loan or manual transcription by
the patron, to which some add that they are not selling the copy but charging
for a service. (2) The reader certifies that it is solely for his service use for
scholarship research. (3) The reader certifies that he will make no unautho-
rized use of it. (4) The reader states that he assumes responsibility for copy-
right infringement and will hold the library harmless in any infringement
actions.
The first three provisions had an eye on the Gentleman's Agreement.
285. The full text of the Code was published in 35 A.L.A. BULL. 84 (1941).
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works: non-copyrighted material, copyrighted material, and
manuscripts. Borge Varmer refers to the Code as mainly a
"restatement of the rules of the 'Gentlemen's Agreement"' but
concedes "additional rules of caution are incorporated. 2 8
The Code recognized that there were no legal restrictions
on the reproduction of materials in the public domain. But in
the case of works still in print the recommended policy, for
ethical reasons, was
that before reproducing uncopyrighted material less than
20 years old, either for sale or for use within the library,
libraries should ascertain whether or not the publication is
still in print and if it is in print should refrain from re-
producing whole numbers or volumes or series of volumes.
This recommendation did not apply to individual articles or
extracts reproduced without profit.
In the case of copyrighted out-of-print materials, mention
was made of the application of the "practical and customary
meaning of 'fair use' . . . for research purposes." The recom-
mended policy was that, "in all cases which do not clearly come
within the scope of the agreement, either the scholar requiring
the reproduction or the library to which the request is made
should seek the permission of the copyright owner before re-
producing copyrighted material." The parties should practice
special care "in the case of illustrations or articles that are
covered by a special copyright." In regard to copyrighted in-
print materials, the statement read:
Legally there is no distinction between in-print and out-
of-print copyright material. Reproduction of in-print
material, however, is more likely to bring financial harm
to the owner of the copyright, and it is recommended that
libraries be even more careful than in the case of out-of-print
material.
The policy relating to unpublished works and manuscripts
not subject to statutory copyright but to literary common law
rights28 7 was that "reproduction may probably be made to as-
286. Varmer, Photoduplication of Copyright Materials by Libraries, Study
No. 15, in COPYRIGHT LAW RmISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SENATE
SuBcommITTEE ON THE JuDciARY, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, 52 (1959).
287. Copyright Law, 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1959). The Yale Law School inserts
the following caveat in the library copy of a manuscript LL.M. or J.S.D.
thesis:
The material in this volume is not "published", and since it is the per-
sonal property of the author, it must not be copied without his permission.
As an added precaution theses are kept under lock and key in the closed stacks.
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sist genuine scholarly research if no publication is involved."
Care was to be exercised to observe all restrictions stipulated by
the donor. Reproduction was to be permitted only when it was
clearly shown that it was authorized.
In the General Inter-library Loan Code of 1952,288 the fol-
lowing two paragraphs, based on the Gentlemen's Agreement,289
appear:
Photographic duplication in lieu of interlibrary loan may
be complicated by interpretations of copyright restrictions,
particularly in regard to photographing whole issues of
periodicals or books with current copyrights, or in making
multiple copies of a publication.
Any request, therefore, that indicates acceptability of a
photographic substitution, under the conditions described
above, should be accompanied by a statement with the sig-
nature of the applicant attesting to his responsibility for
observing copyright provisions in his use of the photo-
graphic copy.
The photocopying problem is still receiving attention. The
Joint Libraries Committee on Fair Use in Photocopying290
undertook, in 1959, a study of library reproduction practices
and the nature of research demand. In March, 1961, the Com-
mittee concluded: (1) The making of a single copy by a library
is a direct and natural extension of traditional library services.
(2) Such service, employing modern copying methods, has be-
come essential. (3) The present demand can be satisfied without
inflicting measurable damage on publisher and copyright own-
ers. (4) Improved copying processes will not materially affect
the demand for single-copy library duplication for research
purposes.
The Joint Libraries Committee, therefore, recommended "that
it be library policy to fill an order for a single photocopy of
any published work or part thereof." As one of its many con-
clusions drawn from the study of library practice and research
demand, the Committee stated: "It is clear from the Committee's
studies that the various codes and agreements heretofore pro-
posed or adopted do not affect or reflect actual practice."
288. 13 COLLEGE AND RESEARCH LiRPAms 350 (1952).
289. See Uridge, The General Interlibrary Loan Code 1952: An Explana-
tiot, 46 LAW LmRPRY J. 7 (1953).
290. Joint Libraries Committee on Fair Use in Photocopying. 1961. Fair
Use in Photocopying: Report on Single Copies. 55 A.L.A. Buu. 572 (1961).
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In sum, there was much ink spilled over nothing. A critical
appraisal of these approaches points out many of the short-
comings. (1) The legal effect is less than perfect insulation from
a copyright infringement suit because all copyright owners will
not be party to the agreement. (2) The problem of large-scale
multiple copying is not solved. (3) The agreement does not con-
tribute to the support of the copyright owner.291 (4) The claim
that no part of a copyrighted work might be copied by any
means without the written permission of the copyright owner
does not square with actual practice as recognized by the courts.
(5) The exemption from liability extended no real protection to
a librarian in any particular case, especially one involving a
publisher not a member of the group with whom the agreement
was reached. (6) The agreement may imply an admission of
wrong-doing. (T) The application of the exemption is limited
by allowing copying only in lieu of loan, solely for purposes of
research. (8) The agreement would not allow copying of out-
of-print material.
For all these reasons the search for a more acceptable basis for
photocopying must not cease.
Agreement on a Contractual Basis for Payment of Royalties.
A possible private approach between copyright holders and
groups of users would be to allow contractually a number of
multiple copies in consideration for payment of royalties. In
truth this is but one step beyond the Gentlemen's Agreements.
On the asset side publishers and authors would receive royal-
ties, multiple copying would be permitted, and accounting and
administrative details would be settled in advance. On the
liability side are many of the same debits seen pertaining to
the voluntary agreements. Also this arrangement might tend
to be exclusive and selective; it would not be subscribed to by
all parties. With the threat of infringement suits and ill-will
hanging over the scene, it is plain that this is more a primrose
path than a bed of roses.
291. The Committee studying the General Inter-library Loan Code of 1952
considered a proposal to instate a fee but decided that means to cut the costs of
service should be explored before sanctioning fees. For possibility of charging
such fees, see General Inter-library Loan Code 1952 § 6. See also Minutes of
the Association of Research Libraries, 12 COLLEGE AND RESEARcH LIBRARIEs 282
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Cleawing House Arrangement. A clearing house2 92 arrange-
ment could be worked out under one of three possible approaches:
(1) the statutory approach, (2) the statutory approach with
a private clearing house, and (3) the private approach. The
statutory approach would be the same as the statutory licensing
approach described above. The administration-including set-
ting, collecting and distributing the fees-would be a part of the
public plan. A slight variation would be to enact the same li-
censing system but leave the clearing house details to be devised
by the private parties. This is reminiscent of the successful
ASCAP approach and much could be said in its favor. A com-
pletely private approach would require working out all the
major details of the statutory licensing arrangement and then
some.
Since the private approach is more flexible and in tune with
our free enterprise heritage, it is well to consider its merits. One
proposal worth mention is that endorsed by the Author's League
of America, Inc.208 The main structure of this system is de-
scribed below:
Clearinghouse: All authors and publishers using the system
would operate under one clearinghouse, through which all
royalties would be paid.
Permission: No advance permission would be required to
make copies of works covered by the system. Users need
only pay the specified royalty and comply with the license
conditions.
Royalty Rates: Royalties would be paid on a cents per
page/per copy basis, depending on the type of work copied
-e.g., prose, poetry, periodical article. Lower rates would
be fixed for nonprofit, educational institutions.
A rate schedule applicable for one year, would be published
annually by the clearinghouse and furnished to libraries,
schools, industrial concerns, and other library users. The
schedule would be posted on copying machines.
292. On the matter of a clearing house see generally, First Annual Report
of the Committee to Investigate Copyright Problets Affecting Communication
h; Science and Education, reprinted in 10 BuLu. COPYRIGHT SOCrETY OF THE
U.S.A. 1 (1962), REPROGRAPHY AND CoPYRIGHT LAW 189 (Hattery & Bush ed.
1964).
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Payment by Stamp: Royalties would be paid by means of
copyright stamps sold through the clearinghouse, post of-
fices and agent-banks. Stamps could also be fixed by
vending machines. Stamp vending machines could be at-
tached to coin-operated copying machines.
Payment Procedure: When copies are made, the person
making them would affix copyright stamps in the amount
of the royalty on a remittance card. The Library of Con-
gress catalog card number may be required; for periodicals
the title would suffice.
Remittance of Cards: Cards would be sent to the central
clearinghouse at a single address. They would be accumu-
lated at the point of copying and mailed bi-weekly or
monthly.
Disbursement of Payments: The clearinghouse would dis-
tribute the cards for each work to its publisher. The pub-
lsher would credit the author, collect the royalties by
redeeming the cards, and pay the author his share of all
royalties collected on all of his works on a semiannual or
annual basis.
Identification of "Licensed" Works: The simplest method
of identifying works covered by the system would be to
publish the fact on the title page of the work.
Conditions: Conditions as to the number of copies that
could be made of certain types of works, and the limitation
on their distribution, would be published in the Rate Sched-
ule.
Special Circumstances: Where special circumstances require
a publisher to fix higher rates or special conditions, for a
particular work for a limited time after publication, this
would be done by a notice on the title page.
Cost of Operation: The expenses of operating the licensing
system would be met from the royalty income and collected
by a discount applied against remittance stamps when they
are redeemed by the clearinghouse.
Policing: Substantial compliance could be encouraged with-
out vigorous policing procedures.
The Author's League clearinghouse system would cause trou-
bles greater than those it could solve. We're better off with
no licensing arrangement at all. Still this is a genuine attempt
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to deal with the troublesome business of copying which is caught
between the penumbra of fair use and infringement. The Au-
thor's League raises the right questions; it is only that the
answers are unsatisfactory.
One critic took the proposal to task:
I see no reason why a pilot, when he is overflying my little
territory, should not stick a few stamps on a 4" by 6" card
(ten seconds) and fill out my grid coordinates on the front
(20 to 60 seconds) and drop the card out of his window
or bomb bay or whatever planes have (three to ten seconds,
depending on the orifice). If my neighbor three miles down-
wind delivered them, I could then cash them in at the CAA
or USAF after I had accumulated, say, a quarter's worth.
It is widely known that sometimes pilots have to fiddle
about with their instruments and so on and cannot always
give these overflight stamps the attention they deserve.
Librarians, too, will be occasionally called away from po-
licing royalty stamps by other business, whatever it is that
librarians do back there. Yet all these matters can be ironed
out in time (X seconds), and readers, librarians, pilots, and
probably other sneaky and impalpable violators, can be
brought into a peaceable kingdom of voluntary, "inherently
honest" stamp-lickers.
2 94
Mr. Weatherford's comments, too, are inane but the implica-
tions are not impalpable. I will postpone discussing a more
feasible approach now, since we are interested only in a general
survey of public and private approaches to this question.
Another private approach took shape under the Committee
to Investigate Copyright Problems:
The CHO [Copyright Clearing House] acts as a switching
device, passing rights to make copies to all CS [Copying
Services] subscribers in the CHO system. In both cases
participation is voluntary, and regulated by some standard
contract. The payments by the set of CS exceed the pay-
ments to the set of publishers by some agreed amount,
which amount maintains the switching action. The result
is presumably an increase in numbers of copies and increased
communication in science, education, and other fields; and
an increase in revenue of publishers. Since the revenue is
294. Weatherford, On the Grindstone, 91 Iz. J. 2784 (1966).
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largely (but not exclusively) in addition to what the pub-
lishers receive for their publications, it is presumably a
means of increasing both, communication among users of
the publications and revenue to publishers of the publica-
tions. Properly designed, the (HO should act as a switch
which supports science by increasing the return on the
intellectual property which the messages represent.
295
This method of solving the copyright duplication problem
has three virtues. It maintains the copyright principle and
sustains that part of the creativity cycle dependent upon copy-
right. It offers an economic switching device, a means for
copiers to pay a modest fee for the privilege of copying, and
enables them to copy by means of the new techniques-that is,
easily, cheaply, rapidly, and lawfully in unlimited amounts. It
is readily extendible to other media.
There is something to be said against this solution. The
worst feature is its dependence on the voluntary cooperation
of publishers and copiers. A voluntary system leaves too great
an abuse gap. Since it would be voluntary, participation would
be less than complete. Too, it runs the risk of being too ex-
pensive to operate and so would not be self-sustaining; thus,
its days would be numbered. Finally, this proposal would obviate
the need for the fair use principle in photocopying. A more
satisfactory solution would leave the fair use doctrine viable.
Ad Hoc Approaches. Several alternatives could be devised
by the interest groups to buy or sell copies. Publishers could
furnish copies or reprints as needed, or big users of literary
material such as libraries or corporations could negotiate re-
quirements contracts or individual licenses. These examples
shade easily into the contractual approaches based on the Gen-
tlemen's Agreement and, thus, share the same inherent disad-
vantages.
C. Program for GeneraZ Revision of the Copyright Law.
The present copyright law is basically the same as the com-
prehensive revision act of 1909.296 Since that day advances in
technology and enterprise have generated new industries and
new methods for the reproduction, proliferation and dissemina-
tion of copyrighted works. Thus, it is no longer true that there
295. Heilprin, Working Paper on the Feasibility of a Copyright Clearing-
house (Committee to Investigate Copyright).
296. Act of March 4, 1909 Pub. L. 349, (March 4, 1909).
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is a clear line between the makers and the users: Authors and
readers are both simultaneously producers and consumers of
the written word.
Between 1909 and 1946 a number of bills to amend particular
provisions of the law were introduced 297 and nine amendments
were enacted.208 None of these bills involved any broad revision
of the law. After it became clear that the United States would
not adhere to the International Copyright Convention, com-
monly known as the Berne Convention, to which most of the
European countries and a number of important countries in
other parts of the world were parties' 299 a new effort was di-
rected toward a new international convention to which both
the member countries and nonmembers of the union would
join. On December 6, 19541, President Eisenhower deposited with
UNESCO the instrument 00 ratifying the Universal Copyright
Convention. Since then six acts"0 ' have been passed amending
individual provisions of the copyright law, some of considerable
substantive importance.
In 1955 the first phase of a three-phase program for general
revision of the copyright laws commenced. The research and
study phase culminated in 1961 when the House Committee on
the Judiciary submitted to Congress the Report of the Register
of Copyrights on the General Revision of the United States
Copyright Law.30 2 The drafting phase, devoted largely to dis-
cussion and debate, lasted for three years. On July 20, 1964:
Chairman Celler introduced a revision bill s3 in both Houses of
the 88th Congress for purposes of further consideration and
debate. The Copyright Office made a partial revision of this
1964 bill taking account of the comments and suggestions it had
297. The most important are considered in their historical perspective in
Goldman, The History of the U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to
1954 , Study No. 1 in COPYRIGHT LAw REvIsioIx: STUDIEs PREPARED FOR THE
SENATE SuBcoLLIrrEE oN THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4-12 (1955).
298. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356; 37 Stat. 488; Act of Mar. 2, 1913, ch. 97,
37 Stat 724; Act of Mar. 28, 1914, ch. 47, 38 Stat. 311; Act of Dec. 18, 1919,
ch. 11 41 Stat 369; Act of July 3, 1926, 44 Stat. 818; Act of May 23, 1928, 45
Stat. 13; Act of July 31, 1939, 53 Stat. 1142; Act of Mar. 15, 1940, 54 Stat.
51; and Act of Sept. 25, 1941, 55 Stat. 732.
299. Ex. REP. No. 5, 83d Cong., June 11, 1954.
300. H.R. 6616, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
301. Act of April 27, 1948, 62 Stat. 202; Act of June 3, 1949, 63 Stat. 153;
Act of Oct. 31, 1951, 65 Stat. 710; Act of July 17, 1952, 66 Stat. 752, Act of
April 3, 1954, 68 Stat. 52.
302. 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
303. HR. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
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received. The third or legislative phase of the general revision
began on February 4, 1965, when Senator McClellan and Repre-
sentative Celer introduced House Bill Number 4347 and Senate
Bill Number 1006 for congressional consideration. This bill was
referred to a subcommittee 04 for hearings on the legislation.
After an executive study of the measure it was recommended
for passage as amended, October 12, 1966.805 The bill's scope and
goal may be briefly stated:
The bill now reported reflects the intricate network of
relationships among the many groups and industries de-
pendent for their existence upon works created by authors,
and represents an effort to reconcile conflicting interests
as fairly and constructively as possible. Despite the com-
plexity and particularization of some of its provisions,
however, the basic aim of the bill is very simple: to insure
that authors receive the encouragement they need to create
and the remuneration they fairly deserve for their cre-
ations.3 06
The dualism of stimulation and reward shines through this legis-
lation with pristine clarity. With this as the background let us
examine the fair use provisions relevant to this paper.
The Recommended Bill's Treatment of Fair Use. Amended
section 107 is highly important for two reasons. It not only
mentions the doctrine but also attempts to provide some gauge
for balancing the equities.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction
in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified
by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the
use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the
factors to be considered shall include:
304. Hearings were held on the measure for 22 days. More than 150 wit-
nesses were heard. The result was an illuminating 3-part, nearly 2000 page,
report of the points and arguments raised by the witness. Hearings on H.R.
4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831 & H.R. 6835 Before Slubcomm. No. 3 of the House
on the Jsdiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1, 2, & 3 (1965).
305. H.R. REP'. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
306. Id. at 32.
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(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.3
°7
This language is substantially the same as that in the 1964
bill.30 8 The author-publisher contingent strongly opposed the
measure as too broad °9 while the research-education band as-
saulted the language as unduly restrictive.3 10 With such unani-
mous opposition, chances for passage were slight. Witness the
trimming it got by the 89th Congress; it was reduced in House
Bill 4347 and Senate Bill 1006 to the frail statement that "the
fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of copy-
right.13 11 This approach was supported on a broad front for
the reason "that the doctrine should remain as flexible as pos-
sible, and that any attempt at definition could freeze the concept
and open the door to massive, unreasonable abuses."3 12 The
educational and related interest groups weakly opposed the
measure on the grounds that it was "vague and nebulous."
313
How did a beefed-up 1964 version rise victorious? The expla-
nation given in the report 314 accompanying the recommended
bill is cavalier and assumes that the Committee can better
judge what the critics of the 1964 bill subjectively meant despite
what they objectively said. Section 107 was revised by the
Committee without further discussion and debate. Since this is
purportedly the last word before formal Congressional considera-
tion, an observer would expect the final provision to represent
either the fairest compromise or the most widely accepted bill
to date. But the Committee proved itself regressive and in its
own words,
intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use,
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way. However,
307. Id. at 194; H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1967).
308. H.R. 11947, H.R. 12354, & S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
309. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6, SUPPLExENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GExmAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1965).
310. Id.
311. H.R. 4347 & S. 1006, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
312. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1966).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 61.
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since this section will represent the first statutory recog-
nition of the doctrine in our copyright law, some explana-
tion of the considerations behind the language used behind
the list of four criteria is advisable. 31 5
Later in its report the Committee discussed the considerations, 31 6
and in so doing they assumed that the critics were wrong and
that the recommended bill listing the four standards was neither
too broad nor too restrictive on its face. By spelling out what
should be left to judicial interpretation, the Committee opted
to assure the critics that they were now correct even if they
had been wrong before.
The Committee emphasizes that its statements with respect
to each of the criteria of fair use are necessarily subject
to qualifications, because they must be applied in combi-
nation with the circumstances pertaining to other criteria,
and because new conditions arising in the future may alter
the balance of equities. It is also important to emphasize
that, by singling out some instances to discuss in the con-
text of fair use, we do not intend to indicate that other
activities would or would not be beyond fair use.317
This means that "other criteria" and "new conditions" are
to be considered only after "fair use" has been determined.
The 1966 bill suggests there are only six fair uses: criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship and research.
Curiously enough it establishes these threshold requirements
without offering a means of determining when the test is met.
However, once a court has determined that a statutorily approved
fair use presents itself, the trier must apply the four standards.
In effect the court is precluded from taking and applying these
as well as other factors to an asserted fair use. Also a court may
never reach this limited four-standard analysis should it deter-
mine that a non-recognized use, say parody, is before the court.
Or do parody and other judicially accepted uses fall within the
six mentioned uses. 318
315. Id.
316. Id. at 62-66.
317. Id. at 61.
318. Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) held
a parody to be fair use because it did not fulfill the demand for the original
work and did not appropriate a greater amount of the original work than was
necessary to recall or conjure up the object of the performance.
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Criticizing the both too broad and too narrow 1964 measure,
one attorney had this to say:
It should be remembered that the doctrine of fair use derives
its vitality from its adaptability to conditions not only as
they exist today but to new conditions which result from
technological and other developments. Stated generally,
the rule may make a definition between a true scholar and
a chisler who infringes a work for personal profit. It can
distinguish between a mere quotation and the theft of an
essential portion of a literary work, and can differentiate
between the infringer who seeks to reap where he has not
sown and the scholar who is motivated solely by the desire
to add to the common reservoir of ideas and information.
Any attempt to confine the doctrine in a straitjacket by
enumeration would destroy its vitality and its ability to
accommodate itself to all conditions and to those as yet
unforeseen.310
The distinction between fair use and copyright infringement
cannot be determined by resort to any fixed rules or criteria.
In each instance the result must depend upon a variety of factors,
sometimes more, sometimes less than four.
The relevance of these various criteria rests upon the not-to-
be-overlooked fact that not all books serve the same function
or enjoy the same market. What may constitute fair use when
factual material is taken from a reference book may well con-
stitute infringement if fictional material were lifted from a
novel. The greater liberality in permitting the use of material
from reference works and scholarly publications represents a
public policy developed by the courts in seeking to reconcile
the exclusive rights of a copyright owner with the requirements
of an overriding public interest.
20
Heretofore, the courts have applied and developed fair use
in the absence of statutory provision. The written provision in
the 1966 amended version is inflexible. In determining whether
there is a fair use in any particular case, the courts are guided
by the exigencies of each situation. Because of the kaleidoscopic
fact patterns, four rigid rules cannot be applied to all situations.
319. Hearings on, H.R. 4347, supra note 304, at 1706.
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V. A PnorosED SoLTInoN
Before going into a proposal it would be wise to set forth
the positions of the interested parties. A solution should satisfy
all legitimate needs and requirements for the use of copyrighted
material in all appropriate areas and by means of all appropriate
devices.
A. The Interests at Stake.
I have tried to indicate that due to the revolution taking place
in the copying machine industry a curious paradox has presented
itself. Never before have the consumers and the producers of
literature become so merged. There may be consuming-producers
or producing-consumers, but they are constantly shifting, and
doing so at the same time. But instead of their pressure points
of interest becoming homogeneous in this process, the producers,
forgetting they have been consumers, clamor for one thing while
the consumers remain aloof and demand another.
What I have tried to suggest is that because of this transition
it may not be realistic to put the copyright office, authors,
publishers, booksellers, copy equipment manufacturers, librar-
ians, teachers, businessmen and so on to separate tests. Even
assuming arguendo that no change has taken place, it is legally
deceptive to sever the thread of common interest in the scientific
and intellectual progress that joins all these interest groups.
To give this question complete airing let us examine some of
the positions they have taken. This should expose the policy
and value bedrock upon which a satisfactory alternative must
finally stand or fall.
Congress and the Copyright Office. The public interest is
represented by the Congress and the Copyright Office. The
Copyright Office like all branches of government may exercise
one of three functions: it frustrates, it approves or it does some-
thing by doing neither.832 This body is not a passive participant
as some have claimed.
322
During the hearings in 1965 the Register of Copyrights,
Abraham T. Kaminstein, made the following remarks3 23 con-
321. Professor Bickel's central contention in THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 200 (1962) is that a court checks, legitimates, or it does neither. Cf.
RODELL, NINE MEN (1955).
322. See REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHT LAw 141 (Hattery & Bush ed. 1964).
323. Hearings on H.R. 4347, stupra note 304, pt. 3, at 1857-73.
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cerning the fair use provisions of the 1965 bill.82 4 Since this
version was not Congress' last word the Register's three main
points are all the more instructive.
8 25
1. Anything that can be done under the doctrine of fair
use now could be done under the bill ....
2. The doctrine of fair use, as the courts have evolved it,
depends on a number of variable factors, including but
by no means confined to the commercial character of the
use and the effect on the author's potential market.
3. While the present law contains a "for profit" limitation
with respect to the rights of public performance, the right
of copying is an absolute right, unqualified by any "for
profit" limitation. Any non-profit copying under the
present law would clearly constitute infringement unless
the doctrine of fair use were applicable. The bill does
not change this situation in any way.3 2
6
Since the Register is clearly correct in stating that the doctrine
of fair use is left at common law to the courts, how could the
Committee on the Judiciary in the next session believe that they
had not frozen the doctrine in the statute by expanding the
statement of fair use in amended section 107?327 The result
cannot be the same when the two statutory models are incom-
patible.328
In the 1961 Report of the Register it was recommended that
the new "statute should include a provision affirming and in-
dicating the scope of the principle that fair use does not infringe
the copy owner's rights.3s29 By "scope" of fair use it may
be inferred that the Register was referring to the eight cate-
gories that were illustrated by example in the report.330 The
kinds of uses that were specifically mentioned were review or
criticism, scholarly or technical works, news reports, teaching,
legislative or judicial use, incidental or fortuitous copying,
324. H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835 & S. 1006, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965).
325. See text at notes 244 & 307 supra.
326. Hearings on H.R. 4347, supra note 304, pt. 3, at 1359-60.
327. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
328. A comparative table of Copyright Revision Bills would be helpful.
329. COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVIsIoN OF THE U. S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87 Cong., 1st Sess.,
25 (1961).
330. Id. at 24.
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library reproduction and parody.3 81 The latter four types of
use were not mentioned in the 1966 bill.88 2 Nor did the report
recommend the inclusion of the relevant factors.883
Despite this apparent slippage from one bill and report to
the next,884 there should be no gap between the underlying
ultimate aim of copyright legislation as set forth in the Con-
stitution and any proposed revision bill. The policy is to foster
the growth of learning and culture for the public interest. A
fuller statement was made in the report on the 1909 Act:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under
the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural
right that the author has in his writings, for the Supreme
Court has held that such rights as he has are purely
statutory rights, but upon the ground that the welfare of
the public will be served and progress of science and use-
ful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited
periods the exclusive rights to their writings. The Consti-
tution does not establish copyrights, but provides that
Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it
thinks best. Not primarily for the benefit of the author,
but primarily for the benefit of the public, such rights
are given. Not that any particular class of citizens, however
worthy, may benefit, but because the policy is believed to
be for the benefit of the great body of people, in that it
will stimulate writing and invention to give some bonus
to authors and inventors.
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ...
two questions: First, how much will the legislation stim-
ulate the producer and so benefit the public, and, second,
how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to
the public? The granting of such exclusive rights, under
the proper terms and conditions, confers a benefit upon
the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary
monopoly 83 5
331. Id.
332. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
333. COPYRIGHT LAW REVIsIoN, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAv, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 25 (1961).
334. See text beginning at note 307.
335. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
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So much for the vague and general public interest as represented
by and seen through the eyes of Congress and the Copyright
Office.
Gopyright Owners. Authors, publishers and copyright own-
ers whose livelihood depends totally or partially upon the sale
of the literary work, stand for the property right and the com-
mercial interest in copyright. Practically speaking, they could
be expected to fight any revision bill that could destroy this
market by allowing the untrammeled use of copying devices
without insuring a fair compensation for that use.
The exclusive rights of a copyright owner now specified in
section one of the copyright law are: (1) the right to make and
to publish copies, (2) the right to make new versions, (3) the
right of public performance, and (4) the right to make records.
These rights have been subjected to certain limitations and ex-
ceptions, including fair use.
The proposed provision for giving the copyright owner ex-
clusive rights appears in section 106 of the new bill:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phono-
records;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyright
work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of owner-
ship, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreo-
graphic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, to display the copyrighted work pub-
licly.
This section follows all of the recommendations of the 1961
Report, 37 and also specifies a fifth exclusive right-that of
public exhibition not now explicitly recognized in the statute.
336. H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
337. COPYRIGHT LAw REvisION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
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Copyright may be thought of as a packet of cumulative and
to some extent overlapping rights.888  It is these five funda-
mental rights that represent a statement of what that packet
consists of. Each of the rights may be subdivided indefinitely
and each subdivision may be owned and enforced separately.880
Everything contained in section 106 is made "subject to sec-
tions 107 through 116,"840 and must be read in conjunction with
those sections which provide limitations,341  availability and
scope,342 or outright exemptions 848 with respect to the copyright
owner's exclusive rights. Thus, section 106(a) is intended to
draw the broad bounds of copyright, and the ten sections that
follow are intended to mark out its compass in particular situa-
tions and for particular kinds of works. 44 To take an example,
"section 106(3) gives the copyright owner the exclusive right
to lend copies of his work, but section 108 makes clear that,
when a library has acquired ownership of a copy, it would
338. "The preparation of a derivative work would usually also involve its
reproduction, and hence the reproduction of the basic work, in copies or phono-
records." COPYRIGHT LAW REvisION, PART 6, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL R VSION OF THE U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LANW, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1965).
339. These rights are set forth in chapter 2 of the new bill entitled "Copy-
right Ownership and Transfer." H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201
(ownership of copyright), 202 (ownership of copyright as distinct from owner-
ship of material object), 203 (termination of transfers and licenses granted by
the author), 204 (execution of transfers of copyright ownership), 205 (recor-
dation of transfers and other documents). These sections of the 1966 bill are
discussed with examples. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 113-25
(1966); COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-78 (1965).
340. HRL 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
341. Id. §§ 107 (limitation on exclusive rights: fair use), 108 (limitation on
exclusive rights: reproduction of works in archival collections), 109 (limita-
tion on exclusive rights: effect of transfer of particular copy or phonorecord),
111(c) (limitation on exclusive rights: secondary transmissions), 112 (limita-
tions on exclusive rights: ephemeral recordings).
342. Id. §§ 111(d) (limitation on exclusive rights: secondary transmissions).
113 (scope of exclusive rights in pictoral, graphic, and sculptural works), 114
(scope of exclusive rights in sound recordings), 115 (scope of exclusive rights
in nondramatic musical works: compulsory license for making and distribut-
ing phonorecords), 116 (scope of exclusive rights in nondramatic musical
works; public performance by means of coin-operated phonorecord players).
343. Id. §§ 110 (limitation on exclusive rights: exemption of certain per-
formances and displays), 111(a) & (b) (limitation on exclusive rights: sec-
ondary transmissions).
344. H.1. REP. No. 2237, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1966); COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
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be free to lend that copy without any obligation to the copy-
right owner."3 145
The exclusive rights given to a copyright owner are "to do
and to authorize" 34 6 any of the activities covered by the packet
of rights. Use of the phrase "and to authorize" is intended to
avoid the problem of the liability of contributory infringers
since the right "to do" could include the right "to authorize."
The example offered by the Committee is that of a person who
legally acquires an authorized print of a motion picture.
3 47
If he then rents it to others for unauthorized public perform-
ance there can be no doubt that he is an infringer.
Copyright is regarded as a unique form of property.348 The
res to which the property right called copyright attaches-the in-
tellectual creation of the author-is incapable of possession ex-
cept as it is embodied in a tangible article, say a manuscript,
but the owner maintains the intangible right to control its re-
production. After publication or disclosure "the tangible articles
... may be in the possession of many persons other than the
copyright owner, and they may use the work for their own en-
joyment, but copyright restrains them from reproducing the
work without the owner's consent.1
3 9
Mr. Justice Holmes gave the classic statement of copyright as
property:
The notion of property starts, I suppose, from confirmed
possession of a tangible object and consists in the right to
exclude others from interference with the more or less free
doing with it as one wills. But in copyright property has
reached a more abstract expression. The right to exclude
is not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is
now in vacuo, so to speak. It restrains the spontaniety of
men, where, but for it, there would be nothing of any kind
to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is a prohibition
345. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAw, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1965).
346. H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. § 106 (1967), H.R. RE'. No. 2237,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
347. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1966).
348. The term property is said to extend to "that dominion or indefinite right
of use or disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things
or subjects." BLACK'S LAw DICTiONARY 1382 (4th ed. 1951).
349, COPYRIGHT LAW REVIsION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS
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of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the
party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand
miles from the owner and without his ever becoming aware
of the wrong. 50
Authors. The authors' interest, the interest most worthy and
deserving of protection, urged adoption of section 107 of the
1965 bill. 51 While favoring the specific recognition of fair use
they felt that any attempt to define the doctrine would be un-
wise.
The revision bill reaffirms the principle of "fair use" which
has been created by court decisions over the last century.
Quite properly, it does not attempt to prescribe specific
rules or requirements. This cannot be done by statute. Fair
use is a concept that has developed and worked successfully
because of the flexibility possible under a process of judicial
interpretation.
852
For good reason the authors were vehemently against carving
out special privileges in the Copyright Act which would permit
uses of the author's work without consent or compensation.
[C]opyright is not a "monopoly,"3 53 nor can the author be
denied adequate protection on the claim that he is simply a
350. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19
(1908).
351. H.R. 4347, Hi. 5680, Hi. 6831, H.R. 6835 & S. 1006, 89th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1965).
352. Hearing on H.R. 4347, HR. 5680, HR. 6831 & HR. 6835 Before Sub-
comm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 1, at 91 (1965).
353. The monopoly claim would not justify special treatment:
It is claimed that copyright is a "monopoly" and, therefore, to protect
the public interest it should be limited in duration, and in the rights
granted. It is a specious argument which your committee has previously
rejected (Rept. No. 1742, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.). At common law and
under the Copyright Act, an author possesses exclusive rights to use
something he has created-and nothing more. He is no more a monop-
olist-in the antitrust sense-than millions of other Americans who own
land, buildings, oil wells, securities, stocks and bonds, automobiles, or
other property. Each one possesses the exclusive rights to use that
which he has created, purchased or inherited. This is property. It is not
"monopoly", as the term is used under the Sherman Act. A monopoly
exists when someone owns enough property or has enough economic
power to control an industry or to prevent competition. The author
of a novel controls only the rights to use it-not the publishing indus-
try or the market in novels. His copyright does not give him the power
to fix the price of all novels; his must compete in the marketplace
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supplicant for "special privileges."854 What is at stake
are the rights an author is to have in something he created
-a book, or play, or musical composition-that he brought
into being and from which society will benefit. He is not
asking for special privileges in public resources or facili-
ties.8 55
The education interests, including the teachers and the libraries,
had argued for such privileges.
Going to the heart of the author's position, the primary by-
product of copyright is incentive and encouragement to continue
the often unrewarding creative process. To grant special priv-
ileges would be to dilute the free enterprise system.
[A]n author who creates something of value is entitled to
enjoy the fruits of his labor; that this is accomplished, in
our society, by securing to him exclusive rights in his
creation so that he may be paid when it is used; that by
securing these rights we provide the incentive for inde-
pendent literary creation; and that all of us-private cit-
izens, education, the Government-will reap the benefits
of the efforts, skill, and enterprise of those who are thus
induced to create and produce.
We believe that where this principle of payments for
property is violated, by appropriating and withholding an
author's rights and by denying him compensation for uses
354. The authors debated the special privilege claim this way:
It is argued that copyright is only a special privilege granted by Cong-
ress to authors. And, that it must be restricted by limitations and
exceptions that permit various free uses of a work, without its author's
consent and compensation, because these serve the public interest. To
support this argument it is claimed that the author has no fundamental
claim to exclusive rights in the work he creates.
We disagree. The author does have a fundamental right to the full and
adequate protection of his works. He needs that protection as a mat-
ter of economic necessity. And, the public interest in the creative arts
requires that he have it.
At the outset, one fundamental fact should not be overlooked. What
Congress is considering are the rights that an author will have in some-
thing he created-a book, or play or musical composition which he
brought into being for the benefit of society. This is a far cry from
granting a private citizen title over public resources (as was done in
the land-grant acts), or from granting someone the exclusive privi-
lege of using public facilities to conduct a business (as is done when
the Government grants a license to operate an airline or a broadcasting
station). The rights granted to an author are rights in a literary or
artistic work that would never have existed but for his act of creation.
Id. at 84-85.
355. Id. at 96.
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of his work, not only he, but society as a whole, is deprived
of the benefits of his creative enterprise. If a work created
by an author is valuable enough to be used, then he should
not be expected to contribute it without payment 1
56
The authors cried that the privileges proposed by the edu-
cators "would have a devastating effect on American scholarship
and publishing." 75  The reasons it would be so harmful were
due largely to the new technology in copying.
Schools and school systems could prepare one, or a hundred,
or 10,000 copies of any book, depending upon how many
teachers required it. They could prepare their own text-
books and anthologies by copying substantial portions of
several copyrighted works. Purchase of books for library
and teaching use would be sharply curtailed. The economic
danger of these proposed exceptions is a major threat. New
means of copying and duplicating are proliferating at an
amazing rate and their cost decreases continually. Even
now they permit inexpensive and rapid reproduction of
single copies or multiple copies of any work or a portion
of a work. As the years pass, they revolutionize the publish-
ing industry.858
The author's position has been poignantly summed up as
follows:
American authors and publishers are an integral part of
our educational system. The author contributes as much as
a teacher who teaches from his book, and he is as much
entitled to be paid for the use of his work in the teaching
process.859
Publishers. The publishers, like the authors, heartily en-
dorsed3 60 the fair use provision of the 1965 bill since it left
"the definition of fair use to the courts where it has rested since
1790."18 61 "As a practical matter," the spokesman for the Ameri-




359. Id. at 97.
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determined only by consideration of the facts of the use. 62
The publishers opposed the educators' request for a more
detailed definition of fair use like that in the 1964 bill and in
the 1965 amended version of section 107, arguing that such a
provision would be unsuccessful. "No effort to spell out fair
use by statute can cover all situations." 63 Their argument
continued in this manner:
It would raise a whole new set of undecided questions for
courts to settle, and would lead of necessity to costly litiga-
tion. Until such questions were settled in the highest court,
no one would know precisely what is fair use and what is
not.
Further, the great virtue of the fair use doctrine is its flexi-
bility, permitting ready application to novel situations as
they arise. Any detailed expansion by statutory language
would introduce elements of rigidity, inappropriate in a
fast changing society. 0 4
In the 1964 bill, section six attempted "to clarify the scope
of the doctrine of fair use . . . without freezing or delimiting
its application to new uses."3 65 This provision, substantially
similar to the amended 1966 bill, was opposed by the author-
publisher interests.30 6 We have already seen that this was ob-
jected to by the educational organizations.367 The fears ex-
pressed have caromed off the earlier bill onto the present draft.
The storm raged, as it did with the authors, over the edu-
cators' proposals. 3 8 To the publishers such use would open
wide the gates to free, uninhibited use of copyrighted materials
in the schools.8 69 The idea was that a foot in the door now
could become a yard wide in the future.
We strongly object to the demand of the educators that




365. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1965).
366. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6, SuPPLEmENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1965).
367. See text at note 309 mtpra.
368. See atpra note 353.
369. Hearings on H.R. 4347, supra note 304, pt. 1, at 146.
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copyrighted work .... Such an act is violation of today's
law and there is no good reason to change the substantive
law in this respect. The fact is the permission to make
single copies is the "open sesame" to the making of multi-
ple copies .... [T]he point need not be labored that if
teachers were to be permitted to copy copyrighted material
(beyond the bounds of fair use), to that degree the author
and publishers of such material would be hurt economically
by diminished sales. Such a situation can lead only to
noncreation and nonpublication of the materials which edu-
cators require.370
A subtle point is the subsidy issue. The publishers claim that
education will not pay its own way in the event the copyright
law stipulates payment for use.8 71 In the public school system
the burden would be shifted to the taxpayers; in the private
school system the students or their parents would stand the
expense. Therefore, this is viewed as an involuntary gratuity
by the publishers and the authors.
[W]hy is it just for copyrighted works of authors to be
taken by teachers without compensation? Of course, all of
us want our children to have the best possible education.
However, we do not expect the builder of a nonprofit school
building to construct it at no charge, nor the furniture
merchant to donate school furniture, nor the supplier of
school supplies to give his products gratis. On what reason-
able theory, then, can the creative writer and his publisher
be expected in effect to donate books? 372
On the equities of this subsidy Professor Nimmer says:
But if every schoolroom or library may by purchasing a
single copy supply a demand for numerous copies through
photocopying, mimeographing, or similar devices, the mar-
ket for copyrighted educational materials would be almost
completely obliterated. This could well discourage authors
from creating works of a scientific or educational nature.
If the "progress of science and the useful arts" is promoted
by granting copyright protection to authors, such progress
may well be impeded if copyright protection is largely
undercut in the name of fair use.373
370. Id.
371. Id. at 140.
372. Id.
373. NImmma, COPYRIGHT 653 (1964).
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If this is to remain a free enterprise society, let the taxpayers
pay the true cost of education, the publishers argue. Publishing
is both a high cost and a high risk business. One high school
textbook will take an investment cost of $50,000 before the book
is available for sale. Elementary school books coming in a
series will cost as much as $1 million before the first copy can
be sold. The high risk results from the fact that there is no
way to market-test the product in classrooms at various stages
of development. The publisher-entrepreneur "cannot know the
market response . . . until they are published."874 The nature
of the publishing industry should help explain why copyright
is so important. 
7 5
Libraies and Educational Institutions. The libraries, uni-
versities and other institutions who in the United States have
argued most forcefully for copying privileges and broad fair
use provisions of one type or another can only be a small frac-
tion of the number of establishments using copyrighted materials
daily without permission. This silent and faceless mob numbers
in the hundreds of thousands. It includes the corner grocery
as well as the giants of industry and finance. However, the
only real dialogue has been between the author-publisher in-
terests and the educators and the libraries. The latter cannot
be said to represent all users, and although there is cause to
distinguish between educational and commercial usage, the
difference does not lie in the profits or the lack thereof.
Here is a profile of the 1984 user:
374. Hearings on H.R. 4347, supra note 304, pt. 1, at 72.
375. The reviewer of a meeting on photocopying pinpoints the problem.
The basic motives of private enterprise that inspire the scientist and
machine producers also motivate the author and publisher. One major
publisher of the U. S. indicated that 30% of his business is in the field
of technology and science. The average number of copies per book in
this field is 3800. If due to mass duplication the volume was materially
reduced he would, out of economic necessity, have to stop printing those
subjects. He stated that all the talk has been directed toward obtaining
the machines or paper at a nominal cost in the interests of the free flow
of information. Without an economic incentive the publishers as private
businesses cannot underwrite the progress that flows from freely ex-
changed information would have to stop producing the originals from
which copies are made. The author is similarly motivated. The well-
spring of literary ideas that must find expression in writing would soon
dry up if the author was not compensated, or subsidizied since he would
have to turn to other means of livelihood.
Kennedy, Anatomy of a Symposium--A Review of the Meeting in Washington,
May 20-23, 1903, on Photocopy, 10 BuLrL. Copy. Soc. (1963). For the prop-
osition that photocopying does not have a significant effect on publishing see
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We are gradually working for the day when the searching
for material requested by all students 76 can be done by
the library staff. Once the student has on his desk Xerox
copies of articles, books, et cetera, to supply his special ques-
tion, then he must search for the pattern, the sense which
emerges from the material arising under his pattern. Pro-
fessional personnel search the material, present the student
Xerox copies of articles, books, et cetera.877
The Toronto Public Library warns:
(Throw it away when you are through; don't lose the ad-
vantage of efficient retrieval in copying.) . . .With elec-
tronic storage and retrieval and photocopying systems
available, every book in the library must earn valuable
shelf space through literary analytic experience.878
What this library proposes to do constitutes copyright in-
fringement unless its use falls within the recognized exception
of fair use.8 79 Like the willful and wanton infringer, a library
supplying copies of whole books and articles, without the copy-
right owner's consent, would be using---even supplanting-
someone else's property as the fundamental element of its serv-
ice without paying for that property. For the proprietor's ex-
clusive right to make and distribute copies of his work-be
it one, two or twenty-is a property right. Such library du-
plication, though it sounds Orwellian, is close at hand. Repro-
duction without consent or compensation, carried to its logical
conclusion, poses a serious threat to the livelihood and existence
of the publisher and the author.
376. It isn't clear from this description how a library is to tell the good
guys, presumably the students, from the bad guys. Perhaps, by the time the
program goes into effect all students will wear white levies or show a pure
heart. What I am inferring is not so facetious. The "Student Status" for copy-
right purposes depends more on the type and the nature of the usage than
whether the bearer flashes a student identification card.
377. 88 LAw LIBRARY J. 1121 (1963).
378. Id. The library of the future is discussed by Janeway, "The Toad Be-
neath the Harrow Knows . . ." 91 LAw LIBRARY J. 887, 888-89 (1966).
379. See generally, Clapp, Library Photocopying and Copyright: Recent
Developments, 55 LAw LInARY J. 10 (1962); VARMER, PHOTODUPLICATION
OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL BY LIBRARIES, STUDY No. 15, PREPARED FOR THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, OF THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDIcIARY, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1960); Smith, The
Copying of Literary Property in Library Collections (pts. 1-2), 46 LAW
LIBRARY J. 197 (1953), 47 LAw LIBRARY J. 204 (1954).
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As a practical matter, publishers have not sued libraries for
such copying even though there may be technical infringement
present. The libraries have been warned though and the worm
could turn. 80
From the viewpoint of the user, here the library, it may
be efficient and effective to cut back the number of copies it
buys and hence has to shelve. But if payment must be made
when the library substitutes Xerox s3 copies for printed copies,
it would have had to purchase to service the reader's demands.
Where the library can afford to serve its readers more effec-
tively, by distributing multiple copies, or readers can af-
ford to pay for more effective service, the author and pub-
lisher are entitled to decide in what circumstances they can
afford to authorize such duplication-and to be paid for the
use of their work, by the library or the reader.382
380. A legal publisher phrased it this way:
The increasing prevalence of photographic and other reproductions of
copyrighted material by libraries has been rather forcibly brought to our
attention in recent years. Our investigation of the matter convinced us
that this practice is not only a technical violation of copyright but in
some instances-and certainly in the aggregate-may constitute a sub-
stantial impairment of our interests.
Perhaps our gravest concern is that we do not, by acquiescence in in-
fringements of this kind, jeopardize our copyright and our right to con-
tinue protection against more substantial infringements by others.
These considerations led us to adopt a policy opposed to such reproduc-
tion of any part of our publications without our consent in each instance.
We have had occasion to assert our rights in this respect, though
fortunately a demand has sufficed so far without any need of legal
proceedings.
Our decision on this matter was reached with great reluctance. We
make every effort to cooperate with the libraries .... But the threat
to our interests is so serious that we feel that no other course is open
to us.
Letter from a law publisher, Aug. 8, 1957, quoted in Price, Photocopying By
Libraries of Copyrighted Material, 5 BuL. Copy. Soc. 345, 345-46 (1958).
No reported cases have been found, however.
381. We are mightily concerned over the misuse of our good name. Xerox
is not only the name of our corporation, it is a registered trademark
.... It is used as a verb; and, of course, this is an incorrect usage.
One can indeed make 30 copies of something on a Xerox machine
(correct usage), but one may not "Xerox 30 copies ....
Use of the generic name for the process, e.g., '... a single xerographic
copy...' or '... a single xerox of the.., 'is to be preferred. Both
of these words are generic terms
I hope you can appreciate our concern inasmuch as to allow the misuse
of our name without calling attention to it would mean that it ulti-
mately would belong to the public just as does the word aspirin.
Letter from Fred Isley, Manager, Public Relations, Xerox Corporation,
quoted it 91 LriARY J. 2740 (1966).
382. REPROORAPHy AD COPYRIGHT LAW 80 (Hatter v. Bush ed. 1964).
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Such a mutual arrangement can be devised.8 3
Educators. With these ideas in mind, we will examine the
teachers' goals, knowing full well that their views cannot and
should not be taken to represent the faceless users.8 4 The edu-
cators deemed the copyright law apt to achieve three aims:
1) An automatic exemption for education to permit lim-
ited copying and reproduction of materials for purposes
of teaching, study and/or research where no direct or
indirect commercial advantage or other private gain is
involved without reference to any clearinghouse or li-
censing system.
2) A clarification and delineation of the "fair use" doc-
trine because "fair use" by itself is not a sufficient
guideline for the classroom teacher to know when copy-
righted materials may or may not be used ....
3) A provision which would allow the waiver of statutory
damages by the courts for innocent educational infringers
and the transfer of the burden of proof to the copyright
proprietor in "fair use" proceedings .... 385
383. Until this is done, here are three suggested safeguards for copying
libraries.
(1) Act in good faith and do not knowingly photocopy in a manner to
injure the owner.
(2) Build up a file of advance permissions from copyright owners and
establish a central repository and information agency for them.
(3) Explore the legal possibility and economic necessity of taking out
liability insurance.
384. An illuminating and valuable report is Siebert, Copyrights, Clearances,
and Rights of Teachers In The New Educational Media, AmERcAw COUNCIL
oN EDUCATION (1965). See also Copyrights, Clearances and Rights of Teachers
In The New Educational Media, AmERiCAN COUNCIL ON EDUcATION (1963).
385. Wigren, Education's Concerns in Copyright Law Revision. EDUCATION
AGE (Sept-Oct 1965). The President of the National Education Association,
Lois V. Edinger, named seven objectives for high priority in the Associations'
program.
1. Maximum learning opportunities for all: To contribute to maximum
learning opportunities for each person-and to serve the national in-
terest-by continuous assessment of curriculum content; and the
development and testing of new concepts, procedures, and facilities
which will result in creative instructional programs.
2. Time to teach: To assure staff members the opportunity to devote
their professional competence to professional tasks in an environment
conducive to learning.
3. Professional standands with autonomy and freedom: To develop,
in the public interest and with public consent, the autonomy of the
of the organized teaching profession in the determination of stan-
dards of competence and professional conduct.
4. Financial support: To achieve the enactment of Federal educational
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The President of the National Education Association spoke
of being in the midst of an educational revolution, both in the
areas of content and of methodology.
There are new curriculum developments in the major dis-
ciplines which are based on widespread change in cur-
riculum materials. With the curriculum explosion facing us
in every area and at every level in public education, class
examination of all types and kinds of materials is a neces-
sity if change is to occur at the practical level of classroom
application. At best this is a difficult and complex enough
problem .... The teacher must be free to teach and must
have access to materials to do the job. 8 6
A teacher's job then may include using copyrighted materials
in the following ways: (1) One English teacher copies excerpts
or paragraphs from novels and literature books for the entire
class for the purpose of showing good examples of writing. (2)
Another teacher dittoed some of T. S. Eliot's poems on a one-
per-pupil basis for analysis. (3) Still a third English teacher
uses a piece of poetry as a model for classroom exercises. She
felt that if a student has his own copy to mark he learns much
more than from merely reading a poem. (4) An American Ifis-
tory teacher, in preparing tests, dittoed enough maps for the
class. (5) A Social Studies teacher with the use of an opaque
projector traced a map from a textbook for use as a program
backdrop. (6) A Current Events teacher made a transparency
of a chart showing population growth. (7) An Economics teach-
er used graphs and charts from the New York Times to study
the stock market. (8) A History teacher used transparencies of
newspaper articles to tie current events to history. (9) A guid-
ance counselor copied an article on study habits for distribution
5. Public understanding: To achieve public understanding of the role
and needs of education and a reaffirmation of faith in public educa-
tion.
6. Professional negotiations: To establish formal procedures by which
professional organizations and governing agencies can reach agree-
ment on conditions of work.
7. Strong professional association: To promote maximum development
of dynamic, independent, professional associations at local, State, and
National levels and to achieve unified membership.
Hearings on H.R. 4347, srupra note 304, pt. 1, 381-82.
At least four of these objectives, number one, two, three and five, are directly
served by the teacher's position on the copyright situation and the others are
tangentially related.
386. Hearings on H.R. 4347, supra note 304, pt. 1, at 381.
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to 150 students. (10) Another guidance counselor prepared a
ditto master of a college application to show students how to
fill it out.38 7
These are but a few of the classroom uses that teachers have
in mind when they speak of receiving an automatic exemption.
The combinations and permutations are endless.38 8 The teach-
ers proposed to add a new section 111 entitled "Limitations on
Exclusive Rights: Educational Copies and Recordings":
Notwithstanding the provisions of See. 106, it is not an
infringement of copyright for anyone lawfully entitled
under See. 109 to perform, exhibit, or to transmit a per-
formance or exhibition of, a copyrighted work (save those
originally consumable upon use, such as workbook exer-
cises, problems, or answer sheets for standardized tests)
(a) to make no more than one copy or phonorecord of the
work in the course of such use, provided that no copy
or phonorecord may be made of dramatic works (in-
cluding any accompanying music), pantomimes and
choreographic works, and motion pictures or filmstrips
unless the performers and the audience are limited to
students, faculty, or staff, and
(b) to make a reasonable number of copies of phonorecords
of excerpts or quotations from the work, provided that
such excerpts or quotations are not substantial in length
in proportion to their source,
solely for purposes of such person's or organization's own
teaching, lawful performances, exhibitions and transmis-
sions, for course work study in connection therewith, for
research or for archivial purposes, provided that no such
copyrighted material is sold or leased for profit and that
no direct or indirect private gain is involved. 38 9
The case for the education interests is two-phased, one ideo-
logical and the other pragmatic. On the ideological side they
argue that the purpose of the copyright law is to promote the
useful arts and sciences. :Nothing is more important in pro-
387. Id. at 383-84. See also id. at 318-19, 335-366, 408-09.
388. An instructive lesson is taken from the possible uses of a map of Africa,
taken from the cover of the San Francisco Chronicle of January 31, 1965. Id.
at 411-12. A trenchant analysis of this example under present law, present
practice H.R. 4347 and education's proposals is found at id., pt. 3, at 1770-87.
389. Id., pt. 1, at 339.
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moting the arts and sciences than giving the teachers the
tools needed to inform and instruct. Everyone agrees on the
importance of education to all our people and to the future
of the nation. Therefore, anything that helps those engaged
in education perform their vital role in our society is in the
public interest and ought to be considered most carefully and
favorably by Congress. The proposals advanced,890 the edu-
cators continue, would supply the classroom teacher with what
he needs to do his job in the best way possible. The recom-
mended proposals would provide the right to use copyrighted
material for teaching and learning purposes, without the un-
necessary delays arising from the need for copyright clearances
and the payment of royalties.
The educators urge, therefore, that the progress of the arts
and sciences will best be served if teachers have a wide range
of freedom in copying copyrighted materials for use in their
teaching activities without having either to ask the copyright
owner for permission or to pay the owner royalty for such
copying.
Similarly, the burden of proof 391 in any action for infringe-
ment should be placed upon the copyright proprietor rather
than the teacher, say the educators, so as not to discourage
teachers from performing their obligation to our youth by
making use of copyrighted materials when necessary. Presum-
ably, teachers would more often hesitate to use these materials
if they had the burden of proving the use to be "fair" in an
infringement action.
92
On the pragmatic side the educators believe that adoption
of their proposals is necessary and feasible for three reasons.
First, if fair use is not more precisely defined, the teacher may
be innocently ensnarled in lawsuits or be frightened from
doing what they are in fact permitted to do under the common
390. See id. at 357-59. These proposals are commented on in id. at 338-57.
391. See id. at 346.
392. While the educators agree on including fair use in the statute, they
believe that section 107 should be amended to read as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
right work to the extent reasonably necessary or incidental to a legiti-
mhate purpose such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research is not an infringement of copyright. Noncom-
nercial educational use by a nonprofit educational institution or organ-
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law fair use concept. They claim that the 1965 bill's fair use
provision,
fails to give either clarity or certainty and must be decided
on a case-by-case basis, after the teachers use the materials
and not before. "Fair use" gives teachers and scholars no
assurance of when copyrighted materials may be copied, nor
how much, nor under what specific conditions.... The bill
might well result in a lawyer's paradise by its inducement
to lawsuit. 398
Unless fair use is more specifically defined, a teacher will have
to contact an attorney each time he wants to use some copyright-
ed teaching material.
It is unconscionable to foist off on the classroom teacher
the daily requirement of a legal determination on what
has been called "the most troublesome [question] in the
whole law of copyright." Teachers have a right to look
to congress for clarity and certainty on this subject ... all
the more so because the burden of proof is on the teacher.
. . . Without an automatic exemption . . . fair use might
well become a snare and a delusion to teachers.8 94
Since no one knows precisely what the scope and limits of the
fair use doctrine are, a blanket exemption for teaching and
scholarship would provide a definite standard plus a deserved
advantage for those involved in American education.
Second, such an exemption for teacher would not in the
long run damage sales and profits of authors and publishers,
but would increase them. The educators contend that limited
copying by teachers will help them to disseminate the writings
of authors and poets more widely, and thus the students will
be led to pursue those writers that have aroused their interest
and will eventually obtain more published material by the
author at a good price. Therefore, the educators suggest, the
publishers will in fact be economically benefitted if the teachers'
proposals are adopted in the new copyright law.
Finally, some educators frankly state that "anything less than
requested . . . for restricted educational copies . . . would be
unenforceable in fact and become a dead letter.139 5 This can be
393. Id. at 342.
394. Id. at 344.
395. Id. at 340.
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viewed either as a threat to disregard the law if Congress re-
fuses to succumb to their wishes or a considered opinion that
teachers will refuse to obey any law that requires for the most
part self-enforcement.
In the final analysis the user's case for broad statutory fair
use--whether teachers or brokers-boils down to four points:
(1) a more effective and more inclusive accomplishment of the
longstanding constitutional policy, (2) a clarification of ambig-
uities so that users may readily know what they can legally use,
(3) a logical and reasonable extension of presently available
rights to make effective use possible, (4) a recognition of the
primacy of the public interest so that where the copyright own-
er's interest conflicts with those of the public, the public interest
must prevail.
And, in the main, three arguments are presented against this
position of expansion: (1) There will be a deprivation of prop-
erty rights. (2) The common law fair use doctrine can take care
of all reasonable needs. (3) The copyright owners will be de-
stroyed.
The Copy Machine Induatry. Much of the controversy going
on today over copyright is due to the technological advance-
ments being made in the copying machine industry.3 9 ( As far
as the interests of the industry are concerned it is not certain
that they can be clearly defined or that they are clearly known.
The business of copying is only a segment of the communications
field and the copy machine is but one of many communications
products.302 The giant, Xerox Corporation, is deeply involved
in the field of communications, both as a manufacturer of copy-
396. After World War II photoduplication was still in its infancy. Today,
there are nearly two hundred types of copying machines that use chemicals,
heat or electrostatic methods of operation. Costs of copying range from three
cents to ten cents per page. It is estimated that there are approximately 800,-
000,000 pages of copy made each month, of which five percent consists of
materials under copyright protection. In can thus be seen that machine dupli-
cation though still in its infancy bears considerably upon the interests of
copyright owners. The executive vice-president of Xerox Corp. reported to
the Los Angeles Society of Financial Analysts on June 3, 1965, as follows:
As to the total copying market, its growth also continues at a rapid
pace. In 1964, roughly 93/ billion copies were produced in this country,
resulting in total income for the industry of about $500 million. By
1969, I'd guess that some 25 billion impressions will be made by copiers.
And the "information explosion" will still be accelerating.
Id., pt. 3, at 1430.
397. See the letter from Mr. J. C. Wilson, President, Xerox Corp. to Mr.
Herbert Fuchs, dated Sept. 24, 1965. Id. at 1930.
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ing equipment and as a publisher of books and other educational
materials.3
98
Readers have always felt free to copy by hand from the
works of others for their own infinite variety of personal
reasons. It has become almost as commonplace for copy ma-
chines to do for a reader what he has always been doing and
what he has taken without question as customary practice, 99
except that copy machines make the process speedy and con-
venient. The natural outgrowth has been that a man who
previously would copy two or three sentences from a book to
make personal notes would now copy the whole article or the
whole chapter from a book. Moreover, rather than tell his
friends of the better mousetrap so that they may beat a path
to the door, he'll give them a copy.400 This is the most deleterious
effect of the new copying technology.
Some of the reasons why wholesale copying has become a way
of life are: (1) There is a vast amount of information available
today in printed form and a galloping rate at which it is pro-
liferating and obsoleting yesterday's child. (2) There is a driv-
ing need to absorb ideas and knowledge and look for the latest
word on a subject. (3) There is an increasing need for rapid,
even instantaneous information dissemination that makes delay
intolerable. (4) It is more efficient and time saving to get a
copy of printed material at a reasonable cost than it is to write
the piece out in longhand. (5) The public library is no longer
the sole, static source of written material.
398. The Xerox Corporation made good on a promise made by Joseph C.
Wilson, president, at the annual meeting on May 13. It entered the field of
education in a big way. A joint announcement from Wesleyan University, of
Middletown, Connecticut, and Xerox said that Xerox had purchased American
Education Publication and Wesleyan University Press, Inc., for 400,000 shares
of Xerox common. Based on present market levels the transaction would be
worth about $56 million. In return for its shares Xerox takes over what was
described as the largest educational periodical publishing enterprise in the world.
Mr. Wilson, who is President of Xerox, said that recent acquistitions, in-
cluding University Microfilms and Basic Systems, plus others to be announced
in the next few months, only prove the great opportunities that have opened
in the field of education and industrial training. New York Times, May 22,
1965, at 35.
399. This has been assumed without legal authority. The fact that the gentle-
men's agreement seems to acquiesce, see text at note 280 supra, is not decisive;
it dates back thirty-two years to a time when photocopies capable of wholesale
copying were not available.
400. As a matter of interest, a case, of doubtful authority, held that copying
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The issue is at once apparent. In the public interest, works
that contribute to the advancement of our society in the arts
and sciences must be disseminated rapidly. There must be a
free flow of communication. At the same time, the copyright
owners of these materials must be protected economically or
else there will eventually be no original materials from which
copies can be made.
New photographic materials are being developed and new
copying devices and advanced techniques and products are far
beyond anything we've seen yet.40 1 Someday there will be book-
less libraries. It will be easier to acquire and make a copy
tomorrow than it is today. Looking into the murky crystal ball,
the President's Science Advisory Committee predicted the final
fall of Johannes Gutenberg:
The growth of published information has fostered the in-
vention of many new handling and searching techniques
and concepts. Best known are the retrieval systems based
on automatic machinery. In addition, there are imaginative
new ways of listing titles; for example, permuted titles, of
gaining access to literature (citation indexes), of preparing
abstracts or translations (by machine), of compacting the
physical size of the record (microfilm and microfiches),
of duplicating printed material.
The invention of the new retrieval methods is beginning
to affect our traditional modes of communication. The
traditional forms of the book, journal, and reprint may
eventually give way to the machine storage of graphical
and digital information and machine-generated copy. The
technical publishing business may gradually be transformed
into the information handling business in which the print-
ing press as a means of mass production of identical docu-
ments no longer plays a dominant role.
40 2
401. Presently there are prototypes or, in development, machines that repro-
duce complete books from one original or from data fed into the machine.
Libraries will no longer have to stock their shelves. Hard cover books, as
they are now known, may well become collectors' items. It is envisioned that
when a person wants a book, he will dial his request on a machine at his
place of business or home. This information is relayed by telephone lines to a
central information storage center. From there data is fed back over the same
lines to the machine. This machine in turn reproduces and presents to the
person the complete book or documents desired.
402. PRsmm's ScIEmCE Anvisony CoumiTrEE, SciENcE, GovERNMENT
AND INFORmATiON 20-21 (Jan. 10, 1963).
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The picture as to the future of copying technology is clear;
all signs point to continued progress. Research and development
is aimed at improving present methods while devising new
methods. This part of the communications market continues
to grow like Topsey. Annually it is a quarter of a billion dollar
a year industry and for the last six years has grown at a rate
of 20 percent per year.403 According to one documentation ex-
pert, "while this rate of increase is not likely to continue in-
definitely, nonetheless the copying field is now so highly com-
petitive that to capture any substantial portion of the market
much effort is being expended to achieve the primary goals of
making photocopying faster, easier, better, and cheaper."404
Until we reach the point of satiation as copying becomes
cheaper, the volume of copying will continue to grow. 0 5
With the advent of simpler, faster, better, and most of all,
cheaper machines, strategically placed in prime public traffic
spots, the measure of control over copying that at one time
prevailed has gone by the boards. Where microfilm may have
been used originally to supply a single copy for research pur-
poses in place of manual transcription, any number of additional
unauthorized copies can now be made with the new machines.
Is there any economic damage involved in these practices?
A comprehensive study was performed by George Fry and
Associates who were retained by the National Science Foundation
to ascertain the nature of certain types of documentation prac-
tices on certain types of scholarly and scientific publications.
403. Hawken, Reprographic Technology: Present and Future in R 0RO-
GRAPHIC AND COPYRIGHT LAw, 39, 49 (Hattery & Bush ed. 1964).
404. Id.
405. In library after library, where Xerox 914 machines have been installed,
the volume of copying has skyrocketed. I will cite two examples. A
large university library installed a 914 machine to provide a faster and
cheaper while-you-wait copying service. Up to that time, they had been
using DTR and Verifax at 25 cents per copy. Soon after the 914
machine was installed, the popularity of this service at 15 cents per copy
was so great that this branch of the photographic service had to extend
its hours to remain open in the evenings and on Saturdays. These
measures, however, were still not enough to satiate the demand for
photocopies and the photographic service then had to acquire a second
914 machine and is still obliged to operate extended hours. The second
example is from an institution in Washington that, for some years, pro-
vided a photostat service. In 1960, 4,341 documents were photostated.
The institution then put in a Xerox 914 service. By the end of 1962,
the use of the photostat service had dropped to 634 copies. But, in that
year, 58,000 documents were copied on Xerox 914's.
Id. at 48-49.
The same author discusses the past and present reprographic processes in-
cluding DTR, Verifax, photostat and Xerox in layman's terms, Id. at 39-48.
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The group concluded that "there is no economic damage to the
author group and that . . . the author actually considers dis-
semination through photoduplication an advantage to him."40 6
This is a pernicious conclusion which the findings do not support.
To assume its validity is to say that the scholar has no interest,
commercial or otherwise, other than to attain the widest audience
possible in whatever manner possible-that he is not interested
in a dimension beyond the library shelf. Perhaps, the point to
be made is that the scholar has a deeper interest in protection
through copyright since the nature of his craft is subtly dif-
ferent from that of the author who reaches a wider reader
group.407
As a rebuttal to the Fry findings it is worthwhile to hear out
the President of the Authors Guild.
We do create these books and stories and poems and they
would not exist without us. True, we create them because
we hope other people will be moved by them or amused,
excited or interested. They are not only for our own
pleasure but the claim we make for them is that we made
them.408
There are four kinds of damage that the publisher can sustain.
The first is damage to circulation or sales, the second is damage
to goodwill, the third is damage to reprint and back issue sales,
and the fourth is damage to advertising.
406. Koephe, Assessment of Documentation Practices in Reprography it RE-
PROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHT LAW 50, 57 (Hattery & Bush ed. 1964).
407. An author discussed the potential impact upon writers of the techno-
logical revolution that is taking place in publishing and library service.
Now, there are some writers to whom library sales are not very im-
portant, because they sell 100,000 copies of a novel about the sexual side
of the Nobel Prize right hot off the griddle; and then they sell 500,000
copies in paperbacks, and if it looks as though they'll get up past the
million mark, somebody makes a pilot for a television series to compete
with Peyton Place. Some of these writers are members of the Authors
Guild and they need protection on matters of copyright just as much as
anyone else, and on censorship and taxes they need rather more. I am
all for them. But they do not come into this question much-at any
rate as yet. No, the people who will be hurt most by losing library
sales are authors of serious books, many of them scholarly, many of
them expensive . . . .What is going to happen to the authors of them
if it isn't worthwhile for a publisher to print these books because he
can't see a big enough sale for them?
Janeway, "The Toad Beneath the Harrow Knows . . ." 91 LIBsARY J. 887,
889 (1966).
408. Hearings on H.R. 4347, supra note 304, pt. 1, at 99-100.
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Economic damage does exist, but it would be specious at
best to attempt to estimate the extent of the harm. It suffices to
be aware of the fact that artificially drying up demand with
photocopies is done at the expense and loss of the copyright
holder.
B. The PToposed Optimum Bolution.
This proposal covers four fronts: the doctrine of fair use;
the statutory licensing system with a private clearing house;
the author's moral rights; and the broad matter of educating the
public.
To defile the common law doctrine of fair use by making it a
statutory imperative is to tinker with the judicial process. The
user's hue and cry has been to broaden the doctrine while the
copyright holders oppose this. This reaction is only natural,
but it doesn't deal with the real question which is simply, to
copy or not to copy.
It is argued above that to recognize fair use in a statute by
spelling out factors or by offering a definition or examples as
the 1966 version suggests only leads us deeper into the uncleared
thicket. The doctrine has built-in pitfalls and obstacles that are
best left to the courts. Therefore, the Congress should respond
with silence.
The next stage of overhauling the copyright law is to install
an economically realistic method of meeting the competition
from copying. We may say that the various copyright interest
groups are all ultimately concerned with benefit to their self
interest. If we sift through their various parochial attitudes
and interests we find that they can be classed into two groups:
that of the goose which lays the golden eggs, and her
assistants; and that of the consumers of the eggs, and
their friends and assistants. Since these are intellectual
eggs they are, of course, intellectually and spiritually edible.
Those who produce the golden eggs of intellectual creativity
want protection and encouragement to lay. Those who are
nourished by the intellectual feast want freedom to consume.
While some consumers recognize that productive geese must
be fed and tended, most are aware only of the eggs-and
only after these are so accessible as to seem free--.e., in
the public domain. Users in small quantities often tend to
confuse free physical access with free economic access. Once
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the prototype egg is laid, they may rationalize, what un-
fairness is there in making a little more use of it, say, by
making a personal copy
409
Before the advent of the new technology, the copyright statute
and certain natural limitations of hand copying produced an
effective control over proliferation. Today, however, the user
can amplify the number of replicas to suit himself, without
consulting the copyright holder. There is little chance that an
infringer can be caught, and the effect of infringement can only
be detected by the impact on sales. The areas such as research
where the user has sought to enhance his new status are less
evident economically to the copyright holder than they are
profitable and competitive to the pirate. The final paradox is
that the payment of royalties has not kept pace with the use
of copyrighted material.
The only way to attain a dynamic balance between the two
main factions, the producers and the consumers, and still main-
tain a free enterprise system is to restore the equality of the
two parts of the creativity cycle. The solution most likely to
succeed in the restoration of a system which essentially is
economic is that of a compulsory license and a clearinghouse
for copyright.
A statute should be enacted to provide that once the copyright
owner of a literary work has permitted its use in published form,
anyone else may make a copy of the work upon notifying the
copyright holder and paying a specified royalty. A compulsory
system will work, escaping the Promethian chains of a voluntary
approach in a fashion similar to that used in making phonograph
records of musical works. Likewise, the clearinghouse works
similar to ASCAP, like a switching system, passing rights to
make copies to the users and passing royalties to the copyright
holders. The essential details of the clearinghouse operation as
well as the licensing provision have been discussed in detail
above. It would not be enlightening to go into more detail here.
Let it only be said that the thorniest issue is that of setting a
royalty rate or rates. It would appear reasonable, however, in
light of the discussion above to lump all users together under
one fee schedule without having a preferential regard for any
particular user. This arrangement would carefully correct the
409. Id., pt. 3, at 1472.
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wanderings we saw in the clearinghouse proposed by the Com-
mittee to Investigate Copyright Problems.
410
It has been said that the moral right of the author to protect
his artistic reputation or personal rights vis-a-vis the property
right aspect of his copyright is not adequately protected under
copyright law in the United States. 411 In this country the doc-
trine of moral rights as such, or a statutory substitute, is not
recognized as the basis for safeguarding the personal rights of
authors.412 According to continental views, copyright has two
facets: "the property rights which are objects of commerce and
which terminate after the period fixed by law; and the moral
right which is inalienably attached to the person of the author
and, depending on the particular theory, may or may not survive
the property right aspects of the copyright."
413
The author's moral rights have been recognized within the
scope of the doctrine of libel,414 unfair competition,4 15 right
of privacy4 16 and general principles of equity jurisprudence.O
1'
410. See text at note 295 supra.
411. Stevenson, Moral Right and the Common Law: A Proposal, 6 Copy-
RIGHT L. SYmpOsIum 89 (1955); Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and
American Copyright Law-a Proposal, 24 So. CA. L. REv. 375 (1951);
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors,
Creators, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554 (1950) ; LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PaoRmC-
TION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 581 (1938).
412. It has been pointed out that:
The alleged nonexistence of protection of the author's moral right has
been considered one of the principal obstacles to adherence by the
United States to the Berne and Washington Copyright Conventions,
both of which contain provisions for the protection of the rights of
the author to claim authorship in his work and to prevent others from
interfering with its integrity.
Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, COPYRIGHT LAW R VISION, STUDY
No. 4, PRFEARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS, OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. 115 (1959).
413.-Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, COPYRIGHT LAW REVIsION,
STUDY No. 4, PREPARED FOR THE SUBcoMMIn ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE FOR THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 115 (1959).
414. See, e.g., Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E.
432 (1929). See also D'Altomonte v. N. Y. Herald Co., 154 App. Div. 453,
139 N.Y. Supp. 200, modified and affd iner., 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101
(1913); Gershwin v. Ethical Pub. Co., 166 Misc. 39, 1 N.Y.S.2d 904 (City Ct.
N.Y. 1937).
415. See Proutz v. NBC, 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939); Fisher v. Star
Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921)
416. See Packard v. Fox Film Corp., 207 App. Div. 311, 202 N.Y. Supp.
164 (1923). See also Eliot v. Jones, 66 Misc. 95, 120 N.Y. Supp. 989 (Sup. Ct.
1910).
417. See Drummond v. Altemus, 60 F. 338 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1894). See also,
CADOzo, THE GRowTH OF THE LAw 68-70 (1924).
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For purposes of analysis it will be helpful to divide the doctrine
into its seven components:418 (1) The right of paternity,419 (2)
the right to the integrity of the work,420 (3) the right to create
a work 421 (4) the right to publish or not to publish,42 2 (5) the
right to withdraw the work from circulation, 423  (6) the right
to prevent excessive criticism,424 and (7) the right to relief from
any other violation of the author's personal rights.
42 5
418. The divisions to follow seem to be an extension of the main specific
rights of paternity and integrity and to create and includes the lesser rights,
such as a right to be protected from excessive criticism. The classification is
set forth by STRAUSS, THE MORAL RIGHT OF THE AUTHOR, COPYRIGHT LAW
REvISION, STUDY No. 4, PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 115, 128-29 (1959).
419. See Clemens v. Press Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y. Supp. 206
(Sup. Ct. 1910) ; Ellis v. Hurst, 66 Misc. 235, 121 N.Y. Supp. 438 (Sup. Ct.
1910).; Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., 65 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Granz v.
Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); DeBekker v. Stokes, 168 App. Div. 452,
153 N.Y. Supp. 1066 (1915) ; aff'd vnem., 219 N.Y. 573, 114 N.E. 1064 (1916);
D'Altomonte v. N.Y. Herald Co., 208 N.Y. 596, 102 N.E. 1101 (1913), viodify-
ing 154 App. Div. 453 (1913); Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522 (7th
Cir. 1947); Suzy Products v. Greeman, 140 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
Harms v. Tops Music Enterprises, 160 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
420. De Bekker v. Stokes, 168 App. Div. 452, 153 N.Y. Supp. 1066 (1915),
afj'd venem., 219 N.Y. 573, 114 N.E. 1064 (1916) ; Curwood v. Affiliated Dis-
tributors, 283 F. 219 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1922); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585
(2d Cir. 1952); Royle v. Dillingham, 53 Misc. 383, 104 N.Y.S. 783 (Sup.
Ct. 1907); Drummond v. Altemus, 60 F. 338 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1894); Proutz v.
NBC, 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939) ; Meliodon v.School District of Phila-
delphia, 328 Pa. 457, 195 A. 905 (1938); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian
Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1949) ; Seroff v. Simon & Schuster,
6 Misc. 2d 383, 162 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
421. Roller v. Weigle, 261 F. 250 (D.C. Cir. 1919); Harms v. Stem, 229
F. 42 (2d Cir. 1916); Duff v. Russell, 133 N.Y. 678, 31 N.E. 622 (1892);
Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, 216 F. 269 (E.D. Mo. 1914); Shubert
Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 F. 827 (2d Cir. 1921); Assoc. Newspapers v. Phil-
lips, 294 F. 845 (2d Cir. 1923); Erikson v. Hawley, 12 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir.
1926).
422. See Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (1834). The personal rights of the
author are not affected and are enforceable whether or not the work is published
or under statutory copyright. See Pushman v. New York Graphic Society,
287 N.Y. 302, 39 N.E.2d 249 (1942). See also, Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599,
97 N.E. 109 (1912) ; Grigsly v. Breckenridge, 65 Ky. 480 (1867) ; State ex rel.
Clemens v. Witthaus, 228 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. 1950). The right to publish in-
cludes the right to refrain from publishing, Wallace v. Georgia C. & N. Ry.,
94 Ga. 732, 22 S.E. 579 (1894).
423. See Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135, 84 N.Y.S.2d 713, 89
N.E.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
424. See, State v. Haffer, 94 Wash. 136, 162 P. 45 (1917) ; Berg v. Printers
Ink Pub. Co., 54 F. Supp. 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affd inem., 141 F2d 1022
(2d Cir. 1944). See also, Battersby v. Collier, 34 App. Div. 347 54 N.Y.S. 363
(1898). Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Collier, 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
425. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp.
302 (E.D. Pa. 1938); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127
P.2d 577 (1942) ; Neyland v. Home Pattern Co., 65 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1933);
Shostakovich v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80 N.Y.S.2d
575 (Sup. Ct. 1948) aff'd mere., 275 App. Div. 692, 87 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949);
Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
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Any calculus of moral rights must take each of these groups
into account.
A frank recognition of moral rights would not, however, be
new to the law, since the various aspects of the doctrine keep
recurring no matter how stoutly it is asserted that this doctrine
is an idiosyncrasy of the civil law.426 The essential issue is
not whether we should protect moral rights, but to what extent
it is advisable to recognize the interests of authors independ-
ently of the general principles that have thus far been applied
in the cases. The need is especially strong in the face of this
copying revolution which is threatening to destroy the author
entirely. This militates in favor of our recognizing the doctrine
of moral right and adopting it to our legal system. This is a
problem for Congress and not the courts. Suggestions for an
American moral right doctrine have been abundant.
- VI. SUMMARY
After a quick look at the origin of copyright in America,
we considered the basis and objective of copyright, which is to
stimulate creation "by securing for limited times to authors...
the exclusive right to their ... Writings. 7427 We learned that
this exclusive right has "at all times and in all countries"
428
been subject to what is commonly referred to as a fair use by
someone other than the copyright owner. We said that the
question of fair use arises only after the court has determined
whether there has been an infringement; and if there has, then,
whether it is privileged under the doctrine of fair use.429 We
discussed the background of fair use, the rationale for the doc-
trine and the types of use recognized. We examined the nine
factors the courts weigh in determining whether a use is fair.
426. See Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leeder Press, Inc., 106 F2d 229 (10th
Cir. 1939).
427. U. S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
428. Farmer v. Calvert Lithographing, Co., 8 F. Cas. 1022, 1026 (No. 4,651)
(C.C.E.D. Mich. 1872).
429. Cohen puts it this way:
It is only when the preliminary questions: is the material copyrightable?
Was it copyrighted? was it copied? and was enough copied to satisfy
the "substantial appropriation" doctrine and to make the de ininimus
doctrine inapplicable? have been answered in the affirmative, that the
question of whether there has been a fair use arises.
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We took a longer Olympian look at the available public and
private measures for ordering the protection, and the practices
which meet the needs for copies without infringing upon the
rights of authors or their successors or assigns. We summarized
some of the past efforts to solve the problem and touched on the
current program for Copyright Law Revision.
We ended by asking the usual question: What can be done
to improve the situation? We suggested that a provision be
added to the Copyright Act establishing a statutory licensing
system with a private clearinghouse. Our underlying assumption,
fairly arrived at after viewing the interests of the parties, was
that all users be treated alike. We ended by suggesting the
need for an American moral right doctrine. The suggested meas-
ures would provide a just and workable solution to the problems
posed by the advent of the copying revolution and eliminate any
concern that arises over the fair use doctrine.
VII. EPrrAPH Fo FAI UsE
It seems to me that the major problem is the reproduction of periodical liter-
ature by means of the Xerox machine. Since this activity is almost completely
undetectable, I have absolutely no confidence that any method of undertaking to
collect royalties for such reproduction will be successful, whether it is the vol-
untary approach proposed by CICP or the statute... suggest[ed] imposing [a]
compulsory license.
I feel that, as a practical matter, we will have to suffer through with the pres-
ent system until fully computerized libraries are in use. Then, complete enjoy-
ment of copyright protection will come into flower. I expect that, with new sys-
tems, access to copyrighted literature generally will be secured through a ma-
chine system in the first instance. Under those circumstances, a charge can be
imposed for such access since the use of the literature in that manner always is
identified. It is entirely possible that different charges can be imposed for tran-
sient viewing on a cathode ray tube display and for the delivery of hard copies.
Of course, there would be a lack of control, similar to that experienced now,
over reproduction of hard copies received from such a system. If the charges
for access to the literature are sufficiently low, there will be relatively little
incentive to reproduce hard copy received from the system.
In such an environment, I suspect that there would be little vitality left in the
fair use doctrine. In the normal case, it would be appropriate for the user con-
fronted with a charge for access to undertake to persuade the system operator
to waive the charge because the material is required for a "fair use." Assuming
that the charges will be relatively low and desire for immediate access will be
predominant, reliance upon the fair use privilege would be of little economic ad-
vantage and would impose delay and inconvenience in an effort to persuade the
system operator of its applicability.
430
430. Letter from Roy N. Freed to Hugh J. Crossland. The penetrating and
provocative comments of reprography expert extraordinaire Roy N. Freed on
this manuscript epitomize beautifully my own Monday morning quarterbacking.
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